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ABSTRACT
For refugees and asylum seekers, application of the so-called persecutor
bar is tantamount o a death sentence. However, the Board of Immigration
Appeals-without any real deliberation-has arrived at an interpretation of
a generic-relief, burden-shifting regulation to allow for application of the
persecutor bar based upon very little evidence. Even mere membership in a
group with a poor human rights record has been held sufficient to switch the
burden of proof and apply the bar. While the recent holding of Matter of
Negusie, 27 I&N Dec. 347 (June 28, 2018) can be read and understood
largely as a victory for refugees on the question of the duress defense to the
bar, that decision is under review by the AG. Additionally, more work is
needed to solidify capacious procedural safeguards in the application of the
bar ab initio before adjudicators even reach questions of duress. Safeguards
are crucial because the current procedures allow adjudicators to apply
the bar merely where there is possible assistance in persecution. Given the
dearth of past scholarly attention devoted to procedural application of
the persecutor bar, this article aims to contribute to this nascent, timely,
and largely-untouched iscussion. I argue here that it is only where the
record contains a preponderance of the evidence to allow an adjudicator
to find actual assistance in persecution-and the applicant is given fair
notice and opportunity to respond-that the statute, case law, and inter-
national aw allow the persecutor bar to be applied.
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INTRODUCTION
The persecutor bar is an absolute disqualifier for asylum and refugee
protections, withholding of removal, and several other forms of relief1 for
those "the Attorney General determines" or "decides" have "ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or politi-
cal opinion.' '2 It is a dramatic penalty that permits a noncitizen's deportation
to a country even where she faces a clear probability of fatal harm.3 Yet, for dec-
ades the Board of Immigration Appeals4 (BIA or Board)-the chief administra-
tive body responsible for construing the relevant U.S. legal provisions-had
taken a hardline approach to the issue.5 The BIA had adopted what amounts
to a strict liability test for application of the bar, holding that only the "objec-
tive effects" of an applicant's actions mattered, irrespective of her motiva-
tion or intent.6 As such, it had concluded that even a refugee coerced into
assisting a persecutor would be barred from protection,7 a conclusion of dev-
astating consequence for refugees forced to harm another.8 Indeed, a tragic
1. As discussed in greater detail below, it is also an unqualified bar to Temporary Protected Status,
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NCARA) protection. See infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
2. 8 U.S.C. §§1 158(b)(2)(A)(i); 1231 (b)(3). Asylum is a discretionary form of relief available to non-
citizens in the U.S. who meet the definition of a refugee (i.e., those who are outside of their country of
nationality who are unable or unwilling to return because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion). See 8 U.S.C. §§1158(b)(1)(A); 1101(a)(42). Withholding of removal is a similar form of
protection but is mandatory for those facing a clear probability of persecution in their home country
on account of the same protected grounds listed in the asylum statute. See 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3); I.N.S. v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
3. See Gao v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In evaluating a persecutor bar claim,
it must be remembered that this provision authorizes the deportation of individuals who have established
that they would likely be persecuted."). While some have argued that protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT) which does not have a persecutor bar could protect refugee-persecutors facing
a clear probability of death in their home country, see Tasha Wiesman, Denying Relief To The
Persecutor: An Argument In Favor of Adopting the Dissenting Opinion of Negusie v. Holder, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 559, 579 (2011), this will not be true in every case given the onerous state actor and
acquiescence requirements for CAT relief. Indeed, many refugees facing on-governmental persecution
back home will find it difficult to obtain CAT protection. See e.g., Fuentes-Erazo v. Sessions, 848 F.3d
847, 852 (8th Cir. 2017) (describing the "more onerous" CAT standard for government protection);
Garcia v. Holder, 746 F.3d 869, 874 (8th Cir. 2014) ("Without more, the inability of Guatemalan police
to curtail MS-13 violence does not entitle Somoza to CAT relief.") (emphasis added).
4. The BIA oversees challenges filed to asylum decisions issued by Immigration Judges (IJ), who in
turn provide de novo review of asylum decisions referred from the Asylum Officers (AO), within the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). See generally DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW
OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, (2017 ed.). This article refers to these three entities collectively as
"adjudicators."
5. Kate Evans, Drawing Lines Among the Persecuted, 101 MINN. L. REv. 453,473 (2016).
6. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 434-36 (BIA. 1983), rev'd, Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d
1427 (9th Cir. 1985); Evans, supra note 7.
7. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57 (BIA. 1984); In re Rodriguez-Majano, 191. & N. Dec. 811
(BIA. 1988) (holding that "participation or assistance of an alien in persecution need not be of his own
volition to bar him from relief").
8. Evans, supra note 7.
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though commonplace form of persecution around the world has included
subjecting an individual-a child soldier, for example-to serve as the per-
secutor's weapon against her f iend or family member.9 While being forced
under threat of death to harm loved ones is perhaps the most horrific form of
persecution imaginable, ven refugees trapped in this Sophie's choice would
be barred from relief under the rule originally espoused by the Board.
In 2009, the Supreme Court intervened to correct a latent legal error in the
BIA's analysis, an error which served to anchor the Board's "objective
effects" test.10 In Negusie v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that the BIA
had misread its past precedent o treat as foreclosed the question of whether a
refugee-coerced into assisting with persecution-must be barred from pro-
tection. However, the Court stopped short of offering an answer to the du-
ress defense question.1 2 Instead, the Court elected to remand the matter to the
Board to reexamine the issue unencumbered by its prior flawed legal
analysis. 3
For the next eight years, however, the BIA failed to take up the Supreme
Court's call. It was not until 2016-through the issuance of an amicus invita-
tion and requests for supplemental briefing-that the Board signaled it was
finally prepared to address the issue. In its request for amicus briefs, 4 the
Board presented two questions. First, does "an involuntariness or duress
exception exist to limit the application of the persecutor bar "15 And sec-
ond, "[a]ssuming it is necessary to acknowledge a duress exception to the
persecutor bar, what ought to be the standards (including relevant burdens of
proof) to determine if an applicant for asylum qualifies for such an excep-
tion?" 6 While there has been excellent and thoughtful scholarly discussion
of the first prong of the BIA's question,7 there is virtually no such treatment
9. See Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157,
164 (3d Cir. 2003); see also U.N. Secretary-General, Children and armed conflict: Report of the
Secretary-General, 172-73, U.N. Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757 (Dec. 21, 2007); Susan Tiefenbrun,
Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 415,422 (2008) (estimat-
ing up to 250,000 child soldiers participating in armed conflicts as of that time).
10. Negusiev. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1165-67. The Court relied upon the principles of Chevron to defer to the agencies interpre-
tation of the statute. While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that the robust form of defer-
ence to administrative agencies that has emanated from Chevon is likely in need of correction. Justice
Kennedy, in his recent concurrence in Pereira v. Sessions, chastised the Courts of Appeals' "troubling,"
"reflexive deference" given to agencies in the name of Chevron even where "Congress's intent [can] be
discerned" using "the ordinary tools of statutory construction." 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justice Kennedy notes that "it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appro-
priate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision." Id. at
2121.
14. See Amicus Invitation No. 16-08-08 (Duress Exception to Persecutor Bar), BD. OF IMMIGR.




17. Evans, supra note 7, at 457-58 n.16 (citing Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for
Assisting the Nazis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REv. 97, 112-16, 113 n.90 (1986); Melani
2019]PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN THE PERSECUTOR BAR ANALYSIS 217
of the second.18 The Board was working with a relatively clean slate on which
to craft procedural safeguards.1 9
On June 28, 2018, more than nine years after the Supreme Court's decision
to remand the matter, the Board finally issued its decision in Matter of
Negusie,2 ° which affirmed that the persecutor bar does indeed have a duress
defense.2 Additionally, the Board provided some of the contours to the pro-
cedures involved in the application of the persecutor bar and its duress excep-
tion.22 A number of the procedural safeguards proposed by Mr. Negusie and
amici were adopted by the Board, even while the Board found that Mr.
Negusie failed to qualify for the defense.
However, on the question of one particular point of procedure in relation to
burdens of proof, the Board resisted addressing an error that had been flagged
in briefing.24 In decisions leading up to Matter of Negusie, the Board-without
any real deliberation-had arrived at an interpretation of a generic-relief, bur-
den-shifting regulation (hereinafter "generic-relief regulation")2 to allow for
Johns, Comment, Adjusting the Asylum Bar. Negusie v. Holder and the Need To Incorporate a Defense of
Duress into the "Persecutor Bar," 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 235, 261 (2010); Karl Goodman,
Comment, Negusie v. Holder. The End of the Strict Liability Persecutor Bar?, 13 CUNY L. REv. 143,
159-66 (2009); Tasha Wiesman, Comment, Denying Relief to the Persecutor. An Argument in Favor of
Adopting the Dissenting Opinion of Negusie v. Holder, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 559 (2011); Bryan
Lonegan, Sinners or Saints: Child Soldiers and the Persecutor Bar to Asylum After Negusie v. Holder, 31
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 71 (2011); Abbe L. Dienstag, Comment, Fedorenko v. United States. War
Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 162-70 (1982);
Leah Durland, Comment, Overcoming the Persecutor Bar. Applying a Purposeful Mens Rea
Requirement to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), 32 HAMLINE L. REv. 571, 596-608 (2009); Mark Philipp, Case
Note, Assisting in Persecution. Analyzing the Decision in Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 325 (5th
Cir. 2007), 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417,441-44 (2010)).
18. The present article seeks to address that void, an endeavor made ven more timely by the issu-
ance of the Board's long-awaited decision Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018).
19. Evans, supra note 7.
20. Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. 347 (2018).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 347. The procedural framework I proposed (as counsel for amici) that the BIA largely
adopted in Negusie consisted of the following: First, the persecutor bar analysis must begin with a deter-
mination regarding eligibility for relief. Then, the adjudicator must make findings regarding the substan-
tive elements of "assistance or participation" in persecution, which are: (1) an identifiable act sufficiently
severe to constitute persecution; (2) a nexus between that identified act of harm and a protected character-
istic of the victim; (3) the applicant's conduct constituted genuine assistance or participation in that iden-
tified act of persecution; and (4) the applicant had the requisite prior or contemporaneous culpable
knowledge. This initial showing is DHS's burden. See Proposed Brief for American Immigration
Lawyers Association & National Justice for our Neighbors as Amici Curiae, Matter of Amicus Invitation
No. 16-08-08, https://www.immigrantlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Matter-of-Negusie-Amicus-
Curiae.pdf [hereinafter AILA Proposed Brief]; see generally Kate Evans, Practice Alert. Litigation
Update in Negusie v. Holder. The Board of Immigration Appeals Nears Decision on the Persecutor Bar
(Oct. 2017), http://www.uidaho.edu/-/media/Uldaho-Responsive/Files/aw/academics/practical-skills/
clinics/immigration/Briefs/Practice-Alert Persecutor-Bar-at-the-BIA October-2017.pdf; Negusie, 27 I.
& N. Dec. at 366.
24. See AILA Proposed Brief, supra note 25.
25. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). The regulation provides that "[i]f the evidence indicates that one or more
of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply." I call this the "generic-
relief regulation" because it applies generally to "application[s] for relief," rather than to any particular
form of relief or protection. See id.
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application of the persecutor bar based upon very little evidence.26 Those
decisions had suggested that pointing to any evidence of possible participa-
tion in persecution-even mere membership in a group with a poor human
rights record-was sufficient to switch the burden of proof and require an
applicant for asylum or withholding of removal to effectively prove a nega-
tive (i.e., to prove he or she did not assist or otherwise participate in perse-
cution).27 Frequently, this interpretation was coupled with an attack on the
credibility of the applicant.21 In their combination, this two-pronged
approach was utilized to apply the bar even in the absence of evidence that
an applicant was actually involved in persecution.29 Indeed, some deci-
sions had suggested that it was unnecessary to show the applicant's actual
assistance in persecution; rather, the mere possibility of assistance had
been sufficient to apply the bar.3"
To describe this particular interpretation and application of the generic-
relief regulation31 in the persecutor bar context, I have coined the term "lax-
procedure approach." The overriding concern with this approach is that it
cannot be properly squared with the larger structure of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).32 Nor is it in keeping with the more robust procedural
safeguards developed by the Board in the context of analogous bars.33 In
Matter of Negusie, amici advocated for a construction of the generic-relief
regulation that would have eliminated the risk entailed in the lax-procedure
approach by requiring the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that he applicant actually assisted or
participated in persecution.34 However, instead of adopting that proposed
construction, the Board set the government's burden at a primafacie standard
and did not clearly repudiate its past problematic reasoning regarding the
"low burden" embedded within the generic-relief regulation.35 While the
overall holding in Matter of Negusie can be read and understood largely as a
victory for refugees on the question of the duress defense, that decision is
under review by the Attorney General (AG). 36 Additionally, more work is
26. See infra Section I.B.
27. See id.
28. See id. Being forced to prove a negative is difficult under any circumstance, but it is even more
daunting for a refugee whose credibility has been impugned.
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. See id. A paradigmatic example of this approach can be found in the Board's recent decision
Matter of M-B-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 31, 38 (B.I.A. 2017). A more fulsome discussion of M-B-C- can be
found below in Section I.B. 1.
31. See supra note 27.
32. See infra Section IV.A.
33. See id.
34. See AILA Proposed Brief, supra note 26.
35. See Matter ofNegusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. 347, 366 (B.I.A. 2018).
36. See Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (A.G. 2018). The amicus team involved in earlier
rounds of briefing determined to simply resubmit the previously filed briefs in response to AG Sessions'
October 18, 2018 request for briefs. On February 14, 2019, the Senate confirmed William Barr to replace
Sessions. See Senate confirms William Barr as attorney general in 540to-45 vote, available at https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/william-barr-expected-to-be-confirmed-as-attomey-general-
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needed to solidify capacious procedural safeguards in the application of the
bar ab initio before adjudicators even reach the question of duress.
Safeguards are crucial here because the lax-procedure approach allows for
application of the bar even in the absence of evidence of actual assistance in per-
secution. As such, a refugee may find herself in a situation where the burden is
on her to prove in the abstract why her actions did not assist in persecution, or
was the result of duress, before it is even clear what assistance she is alleged to
have given. Moreover, the AG's decision to refer Matter of Negusie to himself
portends further erosion of safeguards in this context, or at a minimum, ensures
that this matter will be the subject of debate well into the future. Given the
dearth of past scholarly attention devoted to procedural safeguards related to
application of the persecutor bar, and that the topic is currently being litigated,
this article aims to contribute to this nascent, timely, and largely-untouched dis-
cussion. I argue here that it is only where the record contains a preponderance
of evidence to allow an adjudicator to find actual assistance in persecution does
the statute, case law, and international law allow the persecutor bar to be
applied. Moreover, before the bar is finally applied, the applicant must have fair
notice and opportunity to show that DHS has not met its burden. If DHS does
meet its burden, then the burden shifts to the applicant to show that her assis-
tance in persecution was the result of duress. If the applicant cannot meet that
burden, then and only then can the adjudicator determine that the bar applies.
In the pages that follow, I will explore how the Board arrived at the current
set of lax procedures, in an effort to provide a clear path forward for future lit-
igants to advance a more protective procedural framework in the persecutor
bar context. In the first section, I will look at the historical development of
the persecutor bar, including the recent analysis provided by the BIA in
Matter of Negusie7 I will also explore how the BIA's past use of the
generic-relief regulation has been used to improperly force putative refugees
to prove in the abstract that they did not assist in persecution.38 In the second
section, I will analyze the background of the generic-relief regulation and
how its current interpretation as applied to the persecutor bar is unacceptable
in light of the statute and the gravity that application of the bar carries for
those otherwise meeting the refugee definition.3 9 With that foundation laid, I
will proceed with the project of constructing a more protective procedural
framework. In section three, I discuss the necessary substantive components
of "assistance or participation" in persecution.40 And in the final section, I
discuss the minimum procedural safeguards established in similar contexts to
serve as a baseline for the necessary procedural safeguards in the persecutor
thursday/2019/02/13/f162e514-2fla-1 le9-813a-Oab2f17e305b story.html?utm term=.05124a31342a.
As this article goes to print, Barr has yet o issue a decision. While the outcome remains to be seen,
Matter of Negusie is likely to be the subject of litigation for years to come.
37. See infra Section I.A.
38. See infra Section I.B.
39. See infra Section II.
40. See infra Section III.
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bar context.4 1 Within this section, I address the proper allocation of burdens
of proof, the nature of that burden, and the necessary due process protections
of notice and opportunity to be heard.
4 2
I. RECENT HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION OF THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR
A. From Fedorenko To Negusie: The Duress Question
The INA bars asylum and withholding of removal for those "the Attorney
General determines" or "decides" have "ordered, incited, assisted, or other-
wise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."43 Likewise, Congress has categorically excluded from the defini-
tion of a refugee anyone engaged in persecution.44 Collectively, these provi-
sions are referred to as the "persecutor bar."4 5
In U.S. law, the persecutor bar can be traced back to the 1980 Refugee
Act,46 which is itself linked back further to the 1951 Refugee Convention4 7
and 1967 Protocol.4 8 The Refugee Convention was crafted with "the memory
of the [post-World War II] trials of major war criminals ... still very much
alive."4 9 As such, the drafters were careful to include an exclusion to refugee
41. See infra Section IV.
42. See id.
43. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 158(b)(2)(A)(i); 1231 (b)(3) (emphasis added). The asylum version of the persecutor
bar is virtually identical to that of the withholding statute. The asylum statute uses the word "determined,"
while the withholding statute uses the synonym "decide."
44. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42).
45. While the focus of this article is the persecutor bar in the context of applications for withholding
of removal and asylum, a version of the bar is also contained within other areas of the INA and functions
as an absolute bar to several forms of relief. See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (withholding); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(5) (lawful permanent resident (LPR) and non-LPR can-
cellation of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(b)(ii) (temporary protected status); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(a)
(NACARA); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (grounds of inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (grounds of
removability). Additionally, since admissibility is a requirement for adjustment of status, the persecutor
bar can also render one ineligible for permanent residence, and thereby act as a bar to citizenship as well.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(a); 1427.
46. Pub. L. No. 96-212 (1980), 94 Stat. 102.
47. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 2951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 (hereinafter Convention).
48. UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, January 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 (hereinafter Protocol). The United States acceded to Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention when it
signed on to the Protocol in 1968. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 429 (1987). The withholding of removal provision of INA §241(b)(3) (formerly INA sec-
tion 243(h)), which prohibits the removal of a noncitizen to a country where "life or freedom would be
threatened" because of a protected ground, also corresponds to the Convention. See Convention, art. 33.1
(discussing the signatory-states' obligation to not expel or return ('refouler') a refugee where is his life or
freedom would be threatened). The persecutor bar to withholding relief was added by the 1978 Holtzman
Amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1452, at 7 (1978) (noting that "crimes against humanity" include "per-
secution on political, racial or religious grounds").
49. ANKER, supra note 6, § 6:3 (citing GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (2007)).
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protection, in Article TF(a), by barring relief to those who "committed a
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity."5 0 While U.S.
law did not utilize the Convention's exact language in this respect, the U.S.
Supreme Court has long recognized congressional intent to construe the asy-
lum and refugee provisions consistently with the Convention.1 Indeed, the
House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the Refugee Act's perse-
cutor bar explicitly stated that he bar was intended to be "consistent with the
U.N. Convention (which excludes those who, inter alia, committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity).5 2
Yet, despite the clear congressional intent to look to the Convention for
guidance in understanding the scope of the persecutor bar, early decisions by
the Board failed to take this approach.3 Instead, the Board rooted its persecu-
tor bar analysis in a prior Supreme Court case, Fedorenko v. United States.4
In Fedorenko, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the Displaced Persons
Act of 1948 (DPA)55 -a distinct World War II era statute that prohibited the
issuance of visas to persons who assisted in Nazi persecution-contained an
involuntariness exception.56 Utilizing "traditional principles of statutory con-
struction," the Court concluded that no such exception existed.57 The Court
grounded its analysis within the unique structure of the DPA, with its dispar-
ate inclusion and exclusion of the word voluntary in two related bars.58 The
Court thus concluded that the "deliberate omission of the word 'voluntary'
from [the DPA's persecutor provision] compel[led] the conclusion that the
statute made all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible
for visas" regardless of whether their actions were voluntary or not. 9
50. Id.
51. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437 (In noting the link between INA §208(a) and Article 34 of the
Convention, the Court observed that there were "many statements indicating Congress' intent that the
new statutory definition of 'refugee' be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol's definition."); INS
v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 421, 427 (1999) (recognizing that the "withholding provision ... parallels
[the Convention's] Article 33").
52. ANKER, supra note 6, at § 6:4; H.R. REP. No. 96-608 at 9-10 (1979) ("All witnesses appearing
before the Committee strongly endorsed the new [refugee] definition, which will finally bring United
States law into conformity with the internationally-accepted definition of the term 'refugee' set forth in
the ... Convention and the Protocol .. "); id. at 18 (explaining that the statutory bars within the Refugee
Act "are those provided in the Convention.").
53. See e.g., In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 434-36 (B.I.A. 1983), rev'd, Laipenieks v. INS,
750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1984); In re Rodriguez-
Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988).
54. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,512 (1981).
55. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
56. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The DPA provided a bar both for anyone who "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil popula-
tions of countries" and anyone who "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the sec-
ond world war." Id. Given that Congress intentionally excluded the word voluntary when discussing the
DPA's persecutor bar, the Court concluded that "all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians"
would be barred regardless of whether that assistance was voluntary or not. Id.
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JouRNAL
Shortly thereafter, in Laipenieks,6 ° the Board extended Fedorenko's hold-
ing to the Holtzman Amendment, a ground of deportability for those who
"ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in persecution" on
account of a protected characteristic.61 However, in addition to holding that
there was no voluntariness exception in the Holtzman Amendment, the
Board went a step further by stating that a person's "motivation and intent are
irrelevant' 6 2 and that instead the "objective effect" of the person's actions "is
controlling."6 3 The Board later acknowledged that Laipenieks could result in
"harsh or inequitable" outcomes, but insisted that the matter was foreclosed
by Congress.64 When the voluntariness question arose with regard to the
Refugee Act's persecutor bar, the Board in Rodriguez-Majano treated
Fedorenko as dispositive, holding that the Refugee Act's persecutor bar had
no such exception, notwithstanding the material structural differences
between the DPA and the Refugee Act.6"
For the next two decades, the Board continued to apply its objective effects
test, ruling that there was no duress exception to the persecutor bar.6 6
However, this line of cases was brought to a halt in 2009, when the Supreme
Court intervened in Negusie v. Holder.67 In that case, the Eritrean govern-
ment had incarcerated and tortured Mr. Negusie for two years before forcing
him to serve as an armed guard at a prison camp where others like him were
persecuted on account of a protected characteristic.68 The Board, applying
Rodriguez-Majano, held that voluntariness and duress were irrelevant in
assessing the extent to which Negusie's conduct constituted "assistance or
participation in persecution," an interpretation it claimed was compelled by
Fedorenko.6 9
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that
Fedorenko was rooted in the distinct provisions of the DPA,7 ° and therefore
did not bind the Board in its analysis of the Refugee Act.71 The Supreme
Court found that the provisions of the DPA at issue in Fedorenko differed
from the Refugee Act's persecutor bar both textually and in its historical pur-
pose, and that the BIA had therefore erred in assuming Fedorenko controlled
its interpretation of the persecutor bar in the Refugee Act.72 In remanding
60. See e.g., In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 434-36 (B.I.A. 1983), rev'd, Laipenieks v. INS,
750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 465.
63. Id.
64. In re Fedorenko, 19 1. & N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1984).
65. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that "participation or assis-
tance of an alien in persecution need not be of his own volition to bar him from relief").
66. See generally Evans, supra note 25.
67. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
68. Id. at 515.
69. Id. at 519 (citing Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981)).
70. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
71. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516-23.
72. Id.
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Negusie, the Supreme Court, applying the principles of Chevron, U.S.A. v.
Nat'l Resources Defense Council,73 and S.E.C. v. Chenery,74 found that the
refugee statute was ambiguous on the question of duress and left it to the
agency to decide the scope of the persecutor bar in the first instance.75
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion reminded the Board that "[t]he perse-
cutor bar ... was enacted as part of the Refugee Act of 1980 [and] one of
Congress' primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to implement
the principles agreed to in the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.'76 The Supreme Court thus invited the agency to engage in a pro-
cess whereby an "interpretation of the statutory meaning of 'persecution'
may be explained by a more comprehensive definition, one designed to elab-
orate on the term in anticipation of a wide range of potential conduct."
77
While the Supreme Court remanded Negusie in 2009, it was not until 2016
that the BIA began to seriously reconsider the matter.7 8 On August 8, 2016
the BIA issued Amicus Invitation No. 16-08-08,79 which posed two question:
First, does "an involuntariness or duress exception exist o limit the applica-
tion of the persecutor bar in sections 208(b)(2)(A)(i) and 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)
(3)(B)(i)."8 Second, "[a]ssuming it is necessary to acknowledge a duress
exception to the persecutor bar, what ought to be the standards (including rel-
evant burdens of proof) to determine if an applicant for asylum qualifies for
such an exception?"81 Prior to issuing the amicus invitation, the BIA also had
ordered supplemental briefs from Mr. Negusie and DHS.82
In its brief, DHS (under the Obama administration) initially agreed that a
duress defense is appropriate and asked the BIA, " [i]n addition to issuing sub-
stantive duress elements . .. [, to] provide guidance about the procedural
application of the elements."83 DHS urged that when interpreting the perse-
cutor bar the BIA should impose "procedural safeguards" that effectively
focus the bar on "bona fide human rights violators," beginning with a require-
ment that an IJ first "determine whether persecution occurred.'8 4 According
to DHS, only after an IJ rules that the identified conduct meets the legal test
73. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
74. 318 U.S. 80(1943).
75. Negusie, 555 U.S. 519-23 ("Having concluded that he BIA has not yet exercised its Chevron dis-
cretion to interpret the statute in question, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to
the agency for additional investigation or explanation.") (internal quotations omitted) (citing Gonzales v.
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006)).
76. Id. at 520 (citations and quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 524.
78. See generally Evans, supra note 25.
79. See Amicus Invitation, supra note 16.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Evans, supra note 25. DHS filed its supplemental brief on April 20, 2016. It is on file with the
author.
83. DHS Supplemental Brief at 18. (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 11-12,21.
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for "persecution" can she properly evaluate "whether the applicant's acts
could constitute assistance" in that persecution. Sequentially, any analysis of
duress will follow these prior two steps." However, on April 26, 2017, under
the Trump Administration, DHS reversed course and filed a substituted sup-
plemental brief withdrawing from the earlier position advanced in DHS's
2016 supplemental brief.86 This move triggered a new round of amicus brief-
ing and more waiting.
8 7
On June 28, 2018, after nearly three decades of litigation on the duress
question, the Board finally concluded that the persecutor bar did indeed have
a duress defense, albeit a narrow one.88 In reaching this conclusion in Matter
ofNegusie, the Board began by anchoring its analysis in the international law
materials from which U.S. refugee law emerged.8 9 The Board explained that
"[i]t is well established that Congress enacted the Refugee Act to bring the
United States law into conformity with the Convention and Protocol."9
Turning then to the parallel exclusionary clause of the Convention, the Board
concluded that "Congress intended... the persecutor bar [to] be interpreted
in a way that not only comports with our obligations under Article I F(a) ....
but also reflects the international understanding of those obligations."9 1 The
BIA found that "the overriding purpose of... Article IF(a)... is to protect
the 'integrity of the international refugee regime' by ensuring that those who
are undeserving of international refugee protection, in particular war crimi-
nals, cannot benefits under the Convention. "92 In following this line of rea-
soning, the Board took the lead of Professors Kate Evans and Sabrineh
Ardalan93 by looking to the trials of war criminals in Nuremberg for guid-
ance.94 In those proceedings, the "International Military Tribunal recognized
that persons could not be held individually responsible for executing an order
unless they had the ability to make a moral choice."95 Accordingly, the
Tribunals recognized a "duress defense to war crimes," reasoning that "[n]o
court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol to his head, is compelled to
pull a lethal lever."9 6 Given Article 1F(a)'s reference to "war crimes"-a
85. Id.at2l.
86. Brief on file with the author. While DHS asserted in its new brief there should be no duress
exception to the persecutor bar, it still implicitly conceded that clarity is needed related to the "legal
framework" for applying the persecutor bar. See DHS Substituted Supplemental Brief, April 26, 2017, at
18 (citing Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 501-03 (B.I.A. 2011), as the "ostensible legal frame-
work" for a persecutor bar analysis, but questioning how it would work in practice).
87. See supra note 25.
88. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018).
89. Id. at 353-60.
90. Id. at 353.
91. Id. at 356.
92. Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (citing James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on the
Exclusion ofInternational Criminals, 35 MICH. J. INT'L L. 3, 7 (2013)).
93. Professors Evans and Ardalan led the team that authored the International Law Scholars amicus
brief before the Board in Matter of Negusie. See Evans, supra note 25.
94. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 357; see also Evans, supra note 7, at 473.
95. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 357.
96. Id. at 358.
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term historically embedded with a duress defense-and the clear
Congressional intent to construe the Refugee Act consistently with the
Convention (including Article TF(a)), the Board readily concluded that the
persecutor bar to asylum and withholding in U.S. law also carried over this
"principle of duress."97
In elaborating on the contours of this defense, the Board created a five-part
test, requiring at a minimum that the applicant "establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that he (1) acted under an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily injury to himself or others; (2) reasonably believed that the threatened
harm would be carried out unless he acted or efrained from acting; (3) had
no reasonable opportunity o escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) did
not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have
known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and
(5) knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted was not
greater than the threatened harm to himself or others."98
Proceeding then to the procedural framework, the Board explained that the
"adjudicator should first determine whether the applicant is otherwise eligible
for asylum or withholding of removal."99 By beginning the analysis with this
requirement, the question of duress will only arise in cases of individuals
who have already been found to otherwise meet the definition of a refugee on
a record that has been fully developed. If a person is not eligible for refugee
protection, then the adjudicator need not address the persecutor bar. Next,
before reaching the question of duress, the Board discussed the meaning of
the terms "assisted or otherwise participated in persecution.""1 The Board
explains that "[a]s an initial point .. , the term 'persecution' in the persecutor
bar" context carries "the same meaning as it does in the context of determin-
ing ... eligibility for asylum.""1 Thus, the Board reaffirmed that implicit
within the persecutor bar analysis are the requirements that (1) there be an act
of harm sufficiently severe to constitute persecution and (2) that that harm be
inflicted on account of a protected characteristic.10 2 Additionally, to sustain a
finding of assistance or participation in persecution, (3) there must be a con-
nection, or "'nexus[,] between the [applicant's] role, acts, or inaction,"' on
the one hand, and persecution, on the other; and (4) the applicant must have
had "scienter," i.e., "'prior or contemporaneous knowledge' of the persecu-
tion."1 3 Then, utilizing the generic-relief regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d),
10
4
the Board concludes that once "DHS [has] satisfied its initial burden of prov-
ing that the [applicant] assisted or otherwise participated in persecution," the
97. Id. at 359.
98. Id. at 363.





104. See supra note 27.
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"burden shifts to the [applicant] to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the persecutor bar does not apply, either because he did not engage in
persecution or because he acted under duress."' The Board sets DHS's ini-
tial burden on the above points as a requirement to "offer sufficient prima
facie evidence" that he applicant "incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in persecution.""6
The decision in Matter ofNegusie was undoubtedly a triumph for refugees
coerced into involvement with persecution. It represented a distinct break
from past decisions that cruelly barred from relief refugees-such as child
soldiers-forced to harm family or friends. It also brought U.S. law more
closely in line with international interpretations, a development worthy of
celebration."7 However, while some of the procedures adopted in the deci-
sion were certainly a step in the right direction, there is more work to be done
to advance protective procedural safeguards in this context. Specifically,
Matter ofNegusie contained residual language from earlier problematic deci-
sions such that the Board did not necessarily lay to rest what I call the "lax-
procedure" approach.0 ' Rather, the Board in Negusie doubled down and
reaffirmed that "the relevant inquiry under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) is whether
the evidence indicates that the grounds for mandatory denial ... may apply"
to the applicant "so that he then has the burden to show that they do not
apply."0 9 Prior to Matter ofNegusie, the Board had explained in M-B-C- that
"[i]n using the terms 'indicates' and 'may apply' together," the regulation
"does not create an onerous standard and necessarily means a showing less
than the preponderance of the evidence."' ° Rather than distancing itself
from M-B-C-, the Board in Matter ofNegusie cites it approvingly.1 As such,
there still exists a risk that a refugee may be forced to prove a negative based
upon a small amount of evidence related to her alleged involvement in perse-
cution. Additionally, given that Matter of Negusie is currently being
reviewed, what gains were achieved in that decision may well be rolled back.
105. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 367.
106. Id. at 366.
107. The decision also contained a fiery dissent that likely drew the attention of Attorney General
Sessions, who announced on October 18, 2018, that he intended to review the decision. The positive
aspects of Negusie were hard-fought, soundly reasoned, and should withstand even the most withering
scrutiny on the duress question. However, the battle is far from over. The case remains pending as this ar-
ticle goes to print.
108. See supra note 26-32 and accompanying text. Additionally, following Negusie there remains
an unexplained tension between some of the procedures adopted in Negusie that undoubtedly advance
the case for procedural safeguards and the holding and reasoning of Matter of M-B-C-, that unequivo-
cally jeopardize refugees accused of assisting in persecution. These tensions are discussed below in
Section I.B.
109. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 367.
110. Matter of M-B-C-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 31, 36-37 (B.I.A. 2017) (emphasis added). Matter of M-B-C-
is analyzed in greater detail in Section I.B.
111. Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 366-67.
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In the next section, I will explore the cases leading up to Negusie that adopted
the "lax-procedure approach" at which this article takes aim.
B. Past Expansive Application Of The Persecutor Bar Through Lax
Procedures
In the absence of guidance regarding the question of duress, much of the
persecutor bar litigation prior to Matter ofNegusie had focused on the mean-
ing of the term "assistance or participation in persecution," and to a lesser
degree, the procedure for applying the bar. During the course of this litiga-
tion, the BIA adopted an approach incorporating the use of the generic-relief
regulatory framework1 2 to effectively place the burden of proof on the puta-
tive refugee to disprove involvement in persecution based on little more than
speculation that she might have been involved in persecution.
The federal regulation at issue provides that "[i]f the evidence indicates
that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for
relief may apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply."1 3 In several unpub-
lished decisions described below, the BIA used this regulation in the
persecutor bar context and found it sufficient to apply the bar in cases where
the evidence was simply the applicant's concession of past membership in a
group with a bad human rights record.114 In this section, I will trace the devel-
opment of this "lax-procedure approach" from unpublished to published
Board decisions.
In Mazariegos Hernandez v. Holder,"'5 the IJ found the Applicant credible
over the strong objections of DHS. However, the IJ held that the NACARA
persecutor bar applied by agreeing with DHS's framing of the case through
the lens of the generic-relief regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). 6 The
Applicant's "involvement" in persecution in that case consisted only of his
coerced two years of service in the Guatemalan military-a group known for
its human rights abuses-and his deployment to an area of the country where
he twice saw men that he believed were guerrillas tied to a tree in the camp.
He was later ordered to send men under his command to dig graves, though
112. Id.
113. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (emphasis added).
114. Both of the unpublished cases analyzed below involved the persecutor bar to relief under the
Nicaraguan Adjustment And Central American Relief Act ("NACARA"), 111 Stat. 2160. NACARA
"allows ABC class members to seek relief under conditions approximating pre-IRIRA suspension of de-
portation," a repealed form of relief for certain noncitizens with long-term presence in the U.S. See
Hernandez v. Napolitano, No. 8:13CV 113, 2013 WL 6662861, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2013). The "ABC
settlement class was broadly defined as 'Guatemalans in the United States as of October 1, 1990' and
'Salvadorans in the United States as of September 19, 1990."' Id. While the persecutor bar to NACARA
is worded the same as the bar to asylum and withholding, the consequences of application of the bar varies
considerably, ranging from a simple deportation in the case of many NACARA cases, to a probable death
sentence in the case of withholding of removal.
115. No. 13-1793 (8thCir. 2014).
116. See Matter ofMazariegos Hernandez et al., immigration judge decision (Jack L. Anderson),
Omaha, NE (July 27,2011) (on file with the author).
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he did not know for whom. The IJ found credible his testimony that he never
personally captured or harmed (or assisted in the capture or harming of) any
guerrillas. However, the Court found that because DHS presented evidence
that he may have assisted in persecution (i.e., the graves may have been for
the disappeared guerrillas tied to the tree), the IJ shifted the burden and found
that the applicant failed to prove he did not engage in persecution. The BIA
affirmed in an unpublished decision in 2013.117
Similarly, in Cortez-Gaitan v. Lynch,118 the Applicant was also seeking
NACARA relief, but was found ineligible because of the persecutor bar. In
that case, the IJ found that because Mr. Cortez-Gaitan was a soldier who
had guarded guerillas that had been captured and subjected to unspecified
"poor treatment," the government met its burden of establishing that Mr.
Cortez-Gaitan's actions "may have constituted assistance in persecu-
tion."119 The IJ then found implausible Mr. Cortez-Gaitan's denials of any
actual involvement in persecution. As such, the IJ applied the bar because
Mr. Cortez-Gaitan "did not meet his burden of proof... [to] establish[] by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is not barred from relief. ' 12 The
BIA agreed with the IJ in an unpublished decision in 2016.121
Then, in 2017 the Board issued two precedent decisions, Matter of J.M.
Alvarado and Matter of M-B-C-, building off of its prior unpublished deci-
sions to solidify aspects of this lax-procedure approach. 122 While these Board
decisions were issued on records decidedly worse than the unpublished cases
described above, the reasoning employed by the Board in those cases may
have far-reaching effects by expanding application of the persecutor bar
through the use of slipshod procedures.
In Matter of J.M. Alvarado,123 the Board ostensibly placed the initial bur-
den of proof on the applicant in considering the applicability of the persecutor
bar again in the context of a NACARA application.124 It began its analysis by
stating that "[t]o establish eligibility for special rule cancellation of removal
under ... NACARA, the respondent must show that he is not barred from
relief because he ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of an individual because of the individual's race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. "125 While
it is unclear whether the Board intended to place the initial burden to prove a
117. Matter ofMazariegos Hernandez et al., BIA decision (March 7, 2013) (on file with the author).
118. No. 16-1651 (8thCir. 2016).
119. Matter of Cortez Gaitan et al., immigration judge decision (Jack L. Anderson), Omaha, NE
(August 8, 2014) (on file with the author).
120. Id.
121. Matter of Cortez Gaitan et al., BIA decision (February 19, 2016) (on file with the author).
122. See Matter of J.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N, Dec. 27, 28 (B.I.A. 2017); Matter of M-B-C-, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 31, 38 (B.I.A. 2017).
123. 271. & N. Dec. 27,28 (B.I.A. 2017).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
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negative on the applicant,126 in this case, a different burden may not have
made a difference as there was significant evidence of assistance and partici-
pation in persecution.12' That said, this aspect of J.M. Alvarado represented a
troubling move with regard to placing (or effectively placing) the initial bur-
den of proof on the applicant in the persecutor bar context. While Matter of
Negusie clarified that the initial burden of proof in the persecutor bar context
is on DHS, it did not address or otherwise explain how J.M. Alvarado fits into
that analysis. At a minimum, the two decisions now stand in an unexplained
tension with one another.
1 2
Even more concerning, however, was the reasoning employed by the
Board in Matter of M-B-C-.129 There, the Board focused its analysis on inter-
preting the meaning of the extrajudicial killing ground of inadmissibility.
1 30
As in J.M. Alvarado, the Board began by pointing out that a "respondent has
the burden to establish that he satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements
for his applications for relief from removal.1 31 The Board also stated that
"under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)" the relevant inquiry "is whether the evidence
indicates that the ground[] for mandatory denial in section[] 212(a)(3)(E) ...
of the Act may apply to him so that he then has the burden to show that [it
does] not apply.1' 32 In expounding upon the meaning of this regulation, the
Board explains that "[i]n using the terms 'indicates' and 'may apply'
126. Later in the decision after recognizing the uncontested facts of respondent's involvement in
persecution the Board stated that the "respondent does not dispute that he bears the burden to disprove
that he was engaged in persecution." Id. at *28 n.2 (citing Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17,
21 n.3 (noting that once DHS introduces evidence of an applicant's participation in persecution, he has
the burden to disprove that he engaged in persecution); Matter of R-S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 629, 640
(B.I.A. 2003) (stating that "[w]here the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory
denial of an application for relief may apply, the alien has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that such grounds do not apply" in the danger to security bar context)). The BIA's reasoning
in footnote two is in tension with its earlier pronouncement hat the initial burden to disprove the persecu-
tor bar is on the applicant. J.M. Alvarado is also in tension with Negusie, which clearly provided that
DHS bears the initial burden of proof on the persecutor bar. See infra note 130.
127. Indeed, the uncontroverted record evidence indicated that the respondent who served in the
Salvadoran National Guard from 1981 to 1984-captured a detainee and stood guard while "his superiors
severely mistreated" the detainee by "placing needles under his fingernails and that such acts were based
on the victim's political opinion." Matter ofJ.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 28. The Board noted that
"[tihe respondent [did] not contest that he assisted his superiors' actions and that their acts were commit-
ted on account of the victim's political opinion;" nor did "he assert that" he lacked "prior or contempora-
neous knowledge of his superiors' persecutory acts." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
128. Compare Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 366, with Matter ofJ.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec.
at 28.
129. 271. & N. Dec. 31,38 (B.I.A. 2017).
130. Id. at 33 (discussing the meaning of section 212(a)(3)(E)(iii)(II), which renders inadmissible
any noncitizen "who outside the United States, has committed, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the commission of... under color of law of any foreign nation, any extrajudicial killing.")
(emphasis added). The extrajudicial killing bar has similar language to the persecutor bar, but it is a sepa-
rate statutory scheme. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (withholding); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i)
(asylum).
131. Matter of M-B-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 33 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2012) ("An alien
applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish that he alien satisfies
the applicable eligibility requirements; and with respect to any form of relief that is granted in the exercise
of discretion, that the alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion").
132. Id. at 36.
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together," the regulation "does not create an onerous standard and necessar-
ily means a showing less than the preponderance of the evidence."'13 3 Then,
taking the analysis one step further, the Board treats the phrase "the bar may
apply" as being equivalent to saying the applicant may have "committed, or-
dered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated" in an extrajudicial kill-
ing.134 Finally, and without any independent analysis of the Refugee Act-
with its distinct roots in the Refugee Convention and the Protocol-the
Board injects all of its reasoning specific to the extrajudicial killing bar into
the asylum/withholding persecutor bar statutes, apparently having forgotten
the lessons learned in Negusie."35 The Board tersely reasons that "[b]ased on
the above discussion, we conclude that the evidence presented is sufficient to
indicate that the respondent may have assisted or otherwise participated in
this persecution and that his incredible testimony is insufficient to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he did not." '136 Given the disparate struc-
tures of these two bars, it was error to export the analysis of 212(a)(3)(E)
(i.e., a ground of inadmissibility, where the provision functions merely to pre-
vent admission) to the persecutor bar (i.e., an absolute bar to withholding that
authorizes one's removal to a country where she faces a clear probability of
being persecuted).'37
In each of the cases discussed in this section, the BIA's application of the
generic-relief regulation38 to the persecutor bar eveals that it does not
require actual assistance or participation in persecution to apply the bar.
Rather, the most minimal showing-including mere evidence of membership
in an organization with a poor human rights record-is treated as sufficient to
shift the burden and trigger the applicant's responsibility to establish the bar
does not apply. As discussed below, this approach upsets decades of prece-
dent and is irreconcilable with the statute.139 Because this lax-procedure
133. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 37. At first blush, equating "the bar may apply" with "the applicant may have assisted in
persecution" appears sound. However, as explained further below, there are four distinct and necessary
elements to the persecutor bar, and the applicant should be given notice, opportunity to respond, and a
chance to show the conduct was the result of duress. See infra Section III-IV. Frequently DHS offers no
evidence related to nexus, severity of harm, or culpable knowledge. As such, offering some evidence of
just one element (e.g., the applicant had some involvement in an activity where persecution occurred) is
not at all the same as showing possible application of the bar itself.
135. Matter of M-B-C-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 37. See also infra Section IV.A.2.
136. Matter of M-B-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 38. Like the facts in J.M. Alvarado, the facts of M-B-C-
were more incriminating than those discussed above in unpublished decisions. The Board noted in
M-B-C- that "DHS ... presented extensive vidence [including expert testimony] showing not only that
the respondent was a member of military and police units that engaged in extrajudicial killings and geno-
cide during the Bosnian War, but also that his service in those units correspond[ed] with the times and
locations of extrajudicial killings and genocide." Id. at 39. However, the reasoning employed by M-B-C-
and the rules it used to resolve the case are likely to further erode procedural protections needed by refu-
gee charged with assistance or participation in persecution based upon much less evidence, even after
Matter of Negusie.
137. See also infra Section IV.A.2.
138. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).
139. See infra Section III.C.
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approach is rooted in generic-relief regulation and the Board's recent discus-
sion of procedures in the persecutor bar context in Matter of Negusie did not
disavow use of this regulation, I argue that is it now necessary to resist use of
the generic-relief regulation in the persecutor bar context altogether.
140
II. THE NEED TO REFORMULATE THE PERSECUTOR BAR's PROCEDURAL
ANALYSIS
As discussed in the previous section, the BIA has employed the generic
regulatory framework of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) to effectively create-for with-
holding and asylum applicants-the burden to prove that they have not
engaged in persecution based simply upon generalized allegations to the con-
trary. In this section, I look at the history of the regulation at issue, along with
the related asylum-specific and withholding-specific regulations. I use the
term "generic-relief regulation" to describe 1240.8(d) because the regulation
is not specific to asylum, withholding, or any other named form of relief, but
simply applies generally to "application [s] for relief." Throughout this sec-
tion, I juxtapose this generic-relief regulation with the regulations specific to
asylum and withholding of removal (i.e., the "asylum-specific" and "with-
holding-specific" regulations) to show how the generic-relief regulatory
scheme is at odds with the more specific asylum/withholding regulatory
scheme.
Ultimately, my thesis in this section is that the generic-relief regulation
should not be applied at all to claims for asylum and withholding of removal.
Indeed, as currently interpreted and applied in Matter of M-B-C-, and not
clearly repudiated by Matter of Negusie, the regulation is inconsistent with
the statute, particularly in light of the grave consequences that the persecutor
bar carries. Rejecting the generic-relief regulation-as it relates to the perse-
cutor bar-is the approach I believe to be most harmonious with the statute,
the asylum/withholding-specific regulations, the analogous regulatory frame-
works applicable to similar asylum and withholding bars, and international
law.
A. Contrasting the Generic-Relief Regulations with the Regulations
Specific to Applications for Asylum and Withholding
The current generic-relief regulation states that "[i]f the evidence indicates
that" a bar to relief "may apply," the burden shifts to the applicant to prove it
140. One of the amicus briefs in Negusie invited the Board to reframe its use of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)
in manner that would ensure robust procedural protections for refugees. See supra note 25. However, as
discussed above, the Board declined that invitation. In light of the deference accorded to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457,461 (1997), the most likely
successful path for continued advocacy on this issue will be in the form of resisting application of the reg-
ulation altogether in the persecutor bar context.
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does not.141 The key language in this regulation is "may apply." The regula-
tion specific to asylum applications, however, makes no use of the words
"may apply' 14 2 and is completely silent on burden-shifting.143 Rather, the
asylum-specific regulation provides simply that "[flor applications filed on or
after April 1, 1997, an applicant shall not qualify for asylum if... [the perse-
cutor bar] applies to the applicant."'144 Similarly, in the regulation specific to
withholding of removal the words "may apply" are conspicuously absent as
well.145 The withholding-specific regulation provides that "[i]f the evidence
indicates the applicability of one or more of the grounds for denial of with-
holding enumerated in the Act, the applicant shall have the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply."
' 146
Neither the asylum-specific nor the withholding-specific regulations contem-
plate switching the burden to an applicant simply where the persecutor bar
"may apply. ' 147
The same is true if we turn to the asylum-specific regulation applicable to
claims filed before April 1, 1997. That regulation also noticeably omits the
words "may apply.1 4 In the first section, the regulation provides that "[a]n
immigration judge or asylum officer shall not grant asylum to any applicant
... if the [applicant] ... [o]rdered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
141. The regulation in whole provides that:
"The respondent shall have the burden of establishing that he or she is eligible for any requested
benefit or privilege and that it should be granted in the exercise of discretion. If the evidence indi-
cates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply,
the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds
do not apply."
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (emphasis added).
142. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1), with 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2).
143. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(1) (making no reference to burdens of proof related to grounds
of denial for applications filed after April 1, 1997), with 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(2) (stating for applications
filed before April 1, 1997, that "[i]f the evidence indicates that one of the above grounds [of denial] apply
to the applicant," then she "shall have the burden") (emphasis added). Indeed, there is no parallel to the
generic burden-shifting scheme of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) in the current regulations related to post-April 1,
1997 asylum filings.
144. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(1) (emphasis added); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (An applicant is not eli-
gible for asylum "if the Attorney General determines that ... [he or she] ordered, incited, assisted, or oth-
erwise participated in the persecution of any person.
145. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2).
146. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (emphasis added). The current wording of the withholding regula-
tion is consistent with its earliest version. In 1990, the withholding regulation provided that:
"(c)(2) An application for withholding of deportation shall be denied if:
(i) The alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion;
(3) If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for denial of withholding of deporta-
tion enumerated in paragraph (c)(2) of this section apply, the applicant shall have the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply."
55 FR 30674-01 (July 27, 1990) (emphasis added).
147. Id.
148. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(E), with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).
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in the persecution of any person on account of' a protected characteristic.
149
Then, with regard to burden-shifting, the regulation states that "[i]f the evi-
dence indicates that one of the above grounds apply to the applicant, he or
she shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
he or she did not so act."' Again, in neither section does the regulation per-
mit application of the bar, or shifting the burden to the applicant, merely
where an applicant may have assisted or participated in persecution.51
The critical reader, however, may be unconvinced by the disparate use of
the words "may apply," and like the Board, may suggest that the word "indi-
cate" similarly reveals a low burden.15 2 Though not in the current asylum reg-
ulation, it is true that the word "indicate" is present in both the pre-1997
asylum regulation and the withholding regulation.5 3 However, in contrast to
the Board's reasoning in M-B-C-, the word "indicate" does not per se entail a
low burden. Rather, a number of dictionaries define "indicate" to mean to
show, point, or make clear.15 4 While some definitions reveal that the term can
also mean "to strongly suggest," even that understanding does not support a
low-burden construction.5 5 Moreover, as described below, any acceptable
understanding of the asylum/withholding regulations must be developed and
viewed through the lens of the statute, international law, and analogous regu-
latory frameworks, which require more than just possible participation in per-
secution to apply the bar.5 6
But even looking beyond the asylum/withholding-specific regulations,
there is an additional reason to not apply the generic-relief regulation in this
context. The text of the generic-relief regulation, by its own terms, only
applies to an "application for [discretionary] relief.15 7 However, it is well-
established that withholding of removal is not discretionary5 8 and does not
constitute "relief." 9 As such, not only are the two regulatory schemes at
149. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(E) (emphasis added).
150. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
151. Id.
152. See Matter of M-B-C-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 36.
153. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(1), with 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(E), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
(d)(2).
154. See Indicate, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/indicate ("to show..., or to make something clear); Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indicate ("to point out").
155. See Indicate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
indicate (to "[p]oint out; show" or "strongly suggest").
156. See infra Section IV.B.
157. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).
158. See Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 2005) (Withholding "is not discretionary. If an
alien meets the statutory criteria, the Attorney General must withhold removal.") (citing I.N.S. v.
Aguirre Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999)); Matter of I-S- & C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (B.I.A.
2008) ("We note ... that a grant of withholding of removal is not discretionary.").
159. See Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that withholding
of removal is a form of protection, not "relief"); Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture,
64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (February 19, 1999) (providing that individuals with a reasonable fear who would oth-
erwise be subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)'s bar to "all relief under [the] Act," are still entitled to seek
withholding of removal); Herrera Molina v. Holder, 597 F.3d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that
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loggerheads with one another in their varying use of the words "may apply,"
even a simple analysis of the plain meaning and scope of the generic-relief
regulation itself would conclusively rule out its application at least as to
claims for withholding of removal.
These points, taken in conjunction with the fact that the three regulatory
schemes (i.e., generic-relief, asylum-specific, and withholding-specific)
were promulgated at the same time, reveal that it is simply wrong to apply
the generic-relief regulation to either asylum or withholding claims. The
generic-relief regulation and the asylum/withholding-specific regulations
were first promulgated in 199716° during the course of implementing the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"). 161 As such, the drafters were clearly aware of the regulations
specific to asylum and withholding of removal when crafting the generic-
relief regulation and should be presumed to have intentionally used the dis-
parate wording in the various regulatory schemes.162 In reading the
alien subject to reinstatement of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) is still eligible for withholding of
removal).
160. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312-01 (March 6, 1997).
161. Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1997). While there is no case that contains the generic-relief language of
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) earlier than IIRIRA, the pre-IIRIRA asylum regulations did contain similar "may
apply" language in the context of the particularly serious crime bar, firm resettlement bar, and danger to
security bar. See § 208.14(c)(2) (1994) (first promulgated in 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 30674-01). However, that
asylum regulation made no reference at all to the persecutor bar. It provided that:
"If the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for denial of asylum enumerated in para-
graph (c) of this section may apply, the applicant shall have the burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.
(c) Mandatory denials. An application for asylum shall be denied if:
(1) The alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime in
the United States, constitutes a danger to the community;
(2) The applicant has been firmly resettled within the meaning of § 208.15; or
(3) There are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the
United States."
162. See Matter of Villarreal-Zuniga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 886, 889 (B.I.A. 2006) ("We construe the lan-
guage of ... regulation[s] according to the same principles of interpretation applied in determining the
meaning of a statutory provision.") (citing Matter of Masri, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1145, 1148 (B.I.A. 1999));
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 668-69 (2007) (invoking the canon
against surplusage in interpretation of regulations); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)
(using the canon of statutory construction that "[w]here ... particular language" is used in one section
"but omit[ted] ... in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed" to be "intentional[] and
purposefful] in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983)); Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 287 (B.I.A. 2018) ("I must adopt an interpretation
that gives each regulation independent meaning, not one that renders ... [a] regulation unnecessary.")
(citing Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017) ("Our practice ... is to
'give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."') (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 404 (2000))); Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (plurality opinion) ("We resist a
reading of [the relevant statutory provision] that would render superfluous an entire provision passed in
proximity as part of the same Act."); see also Black & Decker Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 986
F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Regulations, like statutes, are interpreted according to canons of construc-
tion. Chief among these canons is the mandate that 'constructions which render regulatory provisions u-
perfluous are to be avoided."') (quoting Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976)); Cont'l Cas.
Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942) ("Generally speaking a 'legislative affirmative description'
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regulations as a whole, it follows that the generic-relief regulation was
only intended to apply to applications for relief that do not otherwise have
a more specific regulatory regime. Because imposing the generic-relief
regulation (which does use the words "may apply") onto the asylum/with-
holding-specific regulations (which do not use the words "may apply")
would render superfluous the precise language selected in the more specific
asylum/withholding regulations, the generic-relief regulation must not be
applied to such claims.163 Rather, in order to give full effect to the asylum/
withholding-specific regulations, the generic-relief regulation must be cab-
ined to only those forms of relief which do not have their own set of spe-
cific regulations.164 To do otherwise is to render a nullity the precise
language utilized in the asylum/withholding-specific regulations.165
Despite the clear differences between the regulations specific to asylum/
withholding and the generic-relief regulation, the Board has yet to recognize
any distinction between the divergent regulatory schemes. Instead, the Board
appears to have reflexively defaulted to the generic-relief regulation to guide
its analysis of claims for asylum and withholding of removal.166 It is not clear
whether the Board has ever been called upon to decide the matter in the con-
text of the persecutor bar; it seems to have simply assumed the generic-relief
regulation's applicability.167 In reality, this should be regarded as an open
question. As discussed in the next section, several courts have cast serious
doubt upon whether use of the "may apply" language of 1240.8(d) in the per-
secutor bar context is consistent with the withholding and asylum statutes,
which require respectively that the adjudicator decide or determine that a per-
son assisted or otherwise participated in persecution.168
implies denial of the nondescribed powers."); Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289
(1929) ("When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
mode.").
163. See infra Section IV.B.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See e.g.,In reR-S-H-,23 I. &'N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2003); Matterof M-B-C-,27 I. &'N. Dec. 31,
38 (B.I.A. 2017).
167. See Matter of M-B-C-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 38. The only published Board decision which cites to
both 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (i.e., the generic-relief regulation) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2) (i.e., the asy-
lum-specific regulation) is In re R-S-H- (utilizing the burden-shifting regulation in the context of the dan-
ger to security bar). The Board there simply assumed 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) applied and did not otherwise
apply the relevant portion of 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2).
168. The INA bars withholding of removal and asylum for those who "the Attorney General decide[s]"
or "determines" have "assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual" because of a
protected characteristic. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i); 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added); see also
Pastora v. Holder, 737 F.3d 902, 906 n. 5 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d)'s language
"may apply" could well be "in tension with the language of the statute" and that the Sixth, Second, and
Seventh Circuits appear "to have read the word 'may' out of the regulation"); Diaz Zanatta v. Holder,
558 F.3d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that "the record must reveal that the [applicant] actually
assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of another"); Gao v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 93,
100 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding the evidence in that case insufficient "to trigger the persecutor bar without evi-
dence indicating that Gao actually assisted in an identified act of persecution"); Singh v. Gonzales, 417
F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) ("for the statutory bars contained in ... [the withholding and asylum stat-
utes] to apply, the record must reveal that the alien actually assisted or otherwise participated in the perse-
cution"); Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (explaining that in Kumar v. Holder,
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B. Decisions Casting Doubt on the Use of the Generic-Relief Regulation
in the Persecutor Bar Context
In contrast to the approach espoused by the Board in M-B-C-, the Second,
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly rejected arguments that
evidence of possible assistance in persecution is sufficient to trigger the
bar,169 and the Fourth Circuit has openly questioned such arguments.170 In
each of these cases, the Courts anchored their analysis to the unambiguous
text of the relevant statutes.
In Diaz-Zanatta, a Sixth Circuit case, the government argued that evidence
that: (1) "Diaz-Zanatta collected intelligence information and provided that
information to her supervisors" in the Peruvian military, and (2) that "ele-
ments of the Peruvian military ... engaged in persecution," was sufficient to
indicate that she may have assisted or participated in persecution such that
the bar applied.171 However, the Court explicitly rejected the government's
argument explaining that absent "evidence linking Diaz-Zanatta's informa-
tion gathering to persecution," it could not find "that she 'actually assisted or
otherwise participated in ... persecution. '172 The Court reasoned that "mere
employment in the Peruvian military intelligence community does not permit
the conclusion that ... she assisted or otherwise participated in any persecu-
tion. ' 173 The Court stated that "under [the IJ's] reasoning, if [the applicant]
had collected intelligence solely on teachers in Peru, and no one but lumber-
jacks had been persecuted by the military, [the applicant] would nonetheless
have assisted or participated in persecution. "174 Rejecting this flawed analy-
sis, the Court held that "the record [must] demonstrate[] some actual connec-
tion between ... [the applicant's] actions and the persecutions in which she is
alleged to have assisted" and "the IJ must determine from the evidence in the
record that ... [the applicant] knew that the information she supplied ... was
being used to persecute. "175
Likewise, the Second Circuit rebuffed an almost identical version of the
argument advanced by the government in Diaz-Zanatta, cautioning against
"permitting generalities or attenuated links to constitute 'assistance. "'176 The
Court in Gao likewise held that "the record ... [there did] not disclose any
actual act of persecution in which Gao allegedly assisted.'177 As such, the
728 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2013), the Court was "[flaced with ... evidentiary gaps," and "did not hold as
the government would have us do here that the persecutor bar should apply because the applicant failed"
to rebut "the circumstantial evidence suggesting that he might have assisted in persecution) (emphasis
added)).
169. See infra Section IV.B.
170. See Pastora, 737 F.3d at 906, n.5.
171. Diaz-Zanatta, 558 F.3d at 458.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 459.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 459-60.
176. See Gao v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
177. See id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 33:213
2019]PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN THE PERSECUTOR BAR ANALYSIS 237
Court rejected the government's argument that evidence that Gao was an ad-
ministrator within the Culture Management Bureau (an agency providing in-
formation to the Chinese government that "could" lead to the arrest of
individuals for political reasons) was sufficient to find that the persecutor bar
may apply.178 The Court states that "the mere fact that Gao may be associated
with an enterprise that engages in persecution is insufficient by itself to trig-
ger the effects of the persecutor bar.' 179 Rather, the Court held that "[b]efore
we can determine whether Gao's conduct 'contributed directly' to
persecution.... the record must first reveal an identifiable act of persecu-
tion, '  in which "Gao actually assisted."81 Thus the court concludes that
"the act of issuing a report that could potentially be used to arrest an individ-
ual is insufficient to constitute a 'direct link' to persecution."' 8 2 Similar anal-
ysis can be found in the Seventh Circuit, in Singh v. Gonzales, and the Ninth
Circuit in Budiono v. Lynch.
1 83
In construing these four decisions, the Fourth Circuit in Pastora v.
Holder,84 suggested that the generic-relief regulation's "may apply" lan-
guage could well be "in tension with the language of the statute."' The
Court in Pastora thus understood the decisions in Diaz-Zanatta, Gao, Singh,
and Budiono "to have read the word 'may' out of the regulation."'86 Indeed,
the holdings of those decisions, like the asylum and withholding statutes
themselves, are utterly irreconcilable with Matter of M-B-C-'s use of the
generic-relief regulation to allow for application of the persecutor bar on a
mere possibility that a refugee assisted or participated in persecution.8 7 At a
minimum, the foregoing decisions must be read to reject any decontextual-
ized understanding of the generic-relief regulation such that nullifies the stat-
utes' mandate that the adjudicator decide/determine that the applicant
assisted in persecution.18 8 While one solution may be-as the Fourth Circuit
suggested-to read "may" out of the regulation, there are problems with this
approach given the extensive deference afforded to an agency's interpretation
its own regulation.8 9 A more straightforward approach-and the one I adopt
178. Id. at 95-100 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 99.
180. Id. at 100-101 (emphasis added).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
183. Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he record must reveal that he alien
actually assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution."); Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1048
(9th Cir. 2016) (explaining an earlier decisions that "did not hold as the government would have us do
here that the persecutor bar should apply because the applicant failed" to rebut "the circumstantial evi-
dence suggesting that he might have assisted in persecution) (emphasis added).
184. 737 F.3d 902, 906, n.5 (4th Cir. 2013).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Matter of M-B-C-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 31, 38 (B.I.A. 2017).
188. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i); 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
189. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457, 461 (1997); Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat'l Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 873 (1984); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,413-14 (1945).
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in this article-is to reject use of the generic-relief regulation altogether in
the persecutor bar context.
Indeed, any interpretation of the generic-relief regulation that allows a per-
son facing a clear probability of persecution in her home country to be
returned to that country on the mere possibility that she was involved in per-
secution cannot be correct.1 90 Because this problem was brought to the atten-
tion of the Board in Matter of Negusie, and it declined to interpret the
regulation in a manner that would dispositively eliminate the risk of the "lax-
procedure approach," I maintain that the generic-relief regulation must not be
applied to the persecutor bar at all. This is true both because of the grave con-
sequences that result from application of the bar and because it is the most
harmonious interpretation of the statute, the asylum/withholding-specific reg-
ulations, and analogous regulatory frameworks adopted by the Board.1 91
C. Guiding Principles for Crafting Adequate Procedural Safeguards
Because the current use of the generic-relief regulation is not a sound foun-
dation on which to build a procedural framework for applying the persecutor
bar, it is necessary to look to another source to anchor the analysis. Yet,
before outlining the contours of those proposed procedural safeguards, it is
important to discuss the normative methodology employed here in approach-
ing the question. There are three principles that should serve to guide the
analysis.
First, the proposed procedural safeguards must be crafted in a manner that
recognizes the severe consequences that adhere in application of the bar in
the worst-case-scenario. The persecutor bar renders one ineligible not just for
withholding of removal and asylum, but also bars relief in a number of other
contexts.192 Because the BIA and courts interpret and construe the virtually
identical persecutor bar language the same,'9' it is crucial to analyze applica-
tion of the bar and the necessary procedural safeguards in the specific context
190. See infra Section IV.B.
191. See infra Section II.C.; Matter of Villarreal-Zumiga, 23 1. & N. Dec. 886, 889 (B.I.A. 2006) ("In
ascertaining the plain meaning of a statutory provision, we read the language in harmony with the word-
ing and design of the statute as a whole .... [A] statute or regulation should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part of it will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.")
(citing Matter of Nolasco, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632, 636 (B.I.A. 1999); Matter of Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836,
838 (B.I.A. 2005); Matter of Masri, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1145, 1148 (B.I.A. 1999)); see also Matter of Y-L-,
24 I. & N. Dec. at 155, 158 (explaining the necessary procedural safeguards in the frivolous asylum bar
context) (emphasis added); Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 501-03 (B.I.A. 2011) (setting forth
the BIA's "framework for making firm resettlement" bar determinations).
192. See supra note 47.
193. A single definition of "persecution" applies both in the context of eligibility for withholding of
removal (the core duty of non-refoulment) and in defining the persecutor bar to withholding, asylum, and
others forms of relief. See Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (B.I.A. 1988) ("As the
concept of what constitutes persecution [in the context of relief] expands, the group which is barred from
seeking haven in this country [due to the persecutor bar] also expands..."), overruled on other grounds
by Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 1159, 1167 (2009).
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where the consequences are most serious.1 94 In the withholding context, the
persecutor bar authorizes the return of a person facing a clear probability of
persecution in her home country,195 and thus the procedural analysis must be
weighed and considered within that paradigmatic context.1 96 The approach I
take here is in marked contrast to that the Board has taken in past decisions,
which seem to instead elaborate on the persecutor bar in the context of appli-
cations for relief-such as NACARA-where the stakes are the lowest.1 97
Second, those safeguards must be developed consistently with the lan-
guage and overall purpose of the Refugee Act. The persecutor bar's sequen-
tial application-and the standards for applying the bar-must be anchored
in the withholding of removal and asylum provisions of the INA in a manner
that is consistent with our obligations under the Refugee Convention and
Protocol.1 98 Any procedural rule as applied to the persecutor bar that nullifies
the statutes' requirement o determine or decide that an applicant participated
in persecution1 99 is ultra vires.2° ° As such, any use or interpretation of a regu-
lation that allows for application of the bar on anything less than a definitive
determination that an applicant actually "assisted, or otherwise participated
in" persecution is simply incompatible with the language and purposes of the
statute. 20 1
Third, the safeguards should be responsive to analogous regulatory
schemes created by the Board in the context of similar bars. The only accept-
able procedural framework for applying the persecutor bar is one that forms a
"symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme' 20 2 that aligns with the
194. See Gao v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In evaluating a persecutor bar
claim, it must be remembered that this provision authorizes the deportation of individuals who have estab-
lished that they would likely be persecuted ... [so] courts must be cautious before permitting generalities
or attenuated links to constitute 'assistance."').
195. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,440 (1987).
196. See Gao, 500 F.3d at 98.
197. See supra Section I.B.
198. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 1168; UN HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), Guidelines on
International Protection, 2 (2003) (noting "the possible serious consequences of exclusion"); UNHCR,
Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, 3-5 (2003) (explaining that exclusion
"must be view in the context of the overriding humanitarian objective of the 1951 Convention"); Ezokola,
[2013] 2 S.C.R. 678 at 693 (Can.) ("The preamble to the Refugee Convention highlights the international
community's ... commitment 'to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of ... fundamental rights
and freedoms.' Our approach to art. 1F(a) must reflect this 'overarching and clear human rights object
and purpose."') (internal citations omitted).
199. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); 1231(b)(3). Those statutes provide that individuals for whom
"the Attorney General decide[s]" or "determines" have "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici-
pated in... persecution" are ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. See infra Section IV.B.
200. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457, 461 (1997) (noting that an administrative approach can
only be sustained if it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute" and that an interpretation of a
regulation cannot control if it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation") (citing Chevron,
U.S.A. v. Nat'l Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 873 (1984); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945)); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980) ("As we have held on
prior occasions, [an agency'] 'interpretation' of the statute cannot supersede the language chosen by
Congress.").
201. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,440 (1987).
202. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000); Matter of C-T-
L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 347-48 (BIA 2010) (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson for proposition that
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Board's explanation of other asylum bars having less serious consequen-
ces.2 3 Specifically, the Board has developed relatively robust procedural
safeguards in the context of the firm resettlement bar and frivolous asylum
bar that should serve as a baseline for the necessary procedural safeguards in
the more serious persecutor bar context.20 4
In the following two sections, I employ the foregoing theoretical frame-
work to craft protective procedural safeguards for applying the persecutor bar
(and its duress defense). These proposed procedural safeguards are broken
down into two components. The first component, enumerated in section
three, discusses the necessary substantive elements of "assistance or partici-
pation" in persecution, which were largely adopted by the Board in Matter of
Negusie.20 5 In sum, before an adjudicator can determine that the bar applies,
she must make factual findings based upon a preponderance of the evidence
in relation to each of the four elements that make up "assistance or participa-
tion" in persecution.206 The second component, detailed in the last section,
advocates for procedural safeguards that will foreclose further use of the lax-
procedure approach that still threatens genuine refugees.20 7 Those proposed
procedures require that an applicant be given notice and opportunity to show
that DHS has not met its initial preponderance burden. If the applicant cannot
rebut DHS's evidence, it may be determined that the bar is triggered, and the
burden then shifts to the applicant to show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the applicant's involvement in persecution was the result of du-
ress. Only after it is determined that the applicant has failed to meet that
burden, can the bar actually be applied.
III. THE FOUR SUBSTANTIVE PRELIMINARY FINDINGS REGARDING WHETHER THE
APPLICANT ASSISTED OR PARTICIPATED IN PERSECUTION
Without an identified act of persecution there is no occasion to reach ques-
tions of assistance or participation. That initial set of findings related to
where key language Congress used to define persecution in the withholding and asylum statutes presum-
ably has the same meaning, adopting different standards for the two forms of relief would be "unharmoni-
ous and asymmetrical.").
203. See e.g., Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 157, 158 (holding that because a"frivolousness find-
ing.., forever bars an alien from any benefit under the Act..., the preponderance of the evidence must
support an Immigration Judge's finding") (emphasis added); Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 501-
03 (B.I.A. 2011) (setting forth a similar four-step analysis for the BIA's "framework for making firm
resettlement" bar determinations, in which DHS bears the initial burden of proof). Below, I analyze these
analogous bars and the procedural safeguards adopted there to create what should serve as a benchmark
in the persecutor bar context.
204. See infra Section IV.A for a more fulsome discussion of these analogous safeguards.
205. See infra Section III. Although, as noted above, AG Barr is reviewing Matter of Negusie. See
supra note 38.
206. Those four elements are: (1) an identifiable act sufficiently severe to constitute persecution;
(2) a nexus between the identified act of persecution and a protected characteristic of the victim; (3) a
finding that the applicant's conduct was connected to that identified act of persecution and involved more
than mere membership in a group that engages in persecution generally; and (4) a finding that the appli-
cant had the requisite scienter (i.e., "prior or contemporaneous knowledge"). See infra Section III.
207. See infra Section IV.
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specific acts of persecution is a necessary "procedural safeguard" in the over-
all application of the persecutor bar because it ensures that a would-be refu-
gee is not forced ab initio to prove in the abstract that she did not assist in
persecution.2 8 In contrast to the cases discussed in Section 1.B above,2 9 a
fair application of this rule will put the refugee on notice as to the specific
conduct which is being impugned before she is required to assert arguments
absolving her of culpability. Moreover, requiring these specific findings
should not be onerous for the adjudicator since before reaching this step of
the analysis, the applicant must have already been found to otherwise meet
the definition of a refugee.2 10
As stated above, the INA bars withholding of removal and asylum for
those who "the Attorney General decide[s]" or "determines" have "assisted,
or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual because of the
individual's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. '21 1 In determining whether the persecutor bar
applies, an adjudicator must specifically find: (1) an identifiable act suffi-
ciently severe to constitute persecution; (2) that the identified act of persecu-
tion was inflicted on account of a protected characteristic of the victim;
(3) that the applicant's conduct was connected to that identified act of perse-
cution and involved more than mere membership in a group that engages in
persecution generally; and (4) that the applicant had the requisite scienter
(i.e., "prior or contemporaneous knowledge").2 12 Each of these elements is
discussed in greater detail below.21 3
A. An Act Sufficiently Severe To Constitute Persecution
A determination that persecution occurred requires factual findings related
to the severity of harm.21 4 The term persecution has the same meaning in the
context of seeking relief as it does in the context of the persecutor bar.215
208. See e.g., Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 155 (B.I.A. 2007) (discussing safeguards in the
frivolous asylum bar context).
209. See supra Section I.B.
210. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 366 (B.I.A. 2018) ("The adjudicator should first deter-
mine whether the applicant is otherwise eligible for asylum or withholding of removal" before reaching
the question of duress); id. at 367 ("[I]ssues raised in these cases involve similar complexities of fact-
finding against a common legal standard .... Recognition of such a [duress] defense, therefore, would
not constitute a departure from the types of questions commonly addressed by the Board and Immigration
Courts. Nor would it impose burdens of fact-finding that are not already encountered in addressing such
questions"). As this article goes to print, Matter of Negusie is still under review. While the AG may over-
rule aspects of the decision, Matter of Negusie's reasoning will remain instructive regardless of the AG's
decision. As such, I have continued to cite the relevant portions of Matter of Negusie in this section.
211. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i); 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
212. Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 366.
213. See id.; infra Section III.A. through III.D.
214. Matter ofNegusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 366; Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929,936 (9th Cir. 2000); Butt
v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 86,90(lst Cir. 2007).
215. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 366 ("[Wle interpret the term "persecution" in the perse-
cutor bar as carrying the same meaning as it does in the context of determining an alien's eligibility for
asylum or withholding of removal"); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 663 (B.I.A. 1988) (emphasis
added); see also Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (B.I.A. 1988) (noting that "the
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While the term "persecution" is not defined in the INA, the significant body
of law developed around eligibility for relief is instructive for understanding
the level of harm required in the persecutor bar context.216
Numerous courts have explained that a "single, isolated incident, or abuse
resulting in minimal injury, does not usually rise to the level of persecutor
harm. ' 217 Rather, the term persecution has been described as a concept lim-
ited to harms that reach a "fairly high threshold of seriousness. "218 Because
the statute-which defines both eligibility for relief and the bar to relief-
uses the same term, persecution, there can be no principled reason to interpret
that term differently in the persecutor bar context than in the context where
one is seeking eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.21 9 While the
Board in Matter of Negusie did not belabor the point, it did begin its analysis
of its framework for applying the bar with a recognition that "we interpret the
term 'persecution' in the persecutor bar as carrying the same meaning as it
does in the context of determining an alien's eligibility for asylum or with-
holding of removal."
22
Therefore, absent a showing of sufficiently severe harm, there is no need to
conduct further analysis related to whether an applicant participated in
concept of what constitutes persecution" in the context of relief is coextensive with the concept of what
constitutes persecution in the context of the persecutor bar), overruled on other grounds by Negusie v.
Holder, 555 U.S. 511,522-23 (2009).
216. Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 366.
217. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE U.S. § 4:13 (2018 ed.) (citing Thapaliya v.
Holder, 750 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that an isolated beating and threats did not constitute per-
secution, noting that "isolated beatings have been commonly rejected as grounds for persecution"); Jian
Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding the petitioner's physical altercation with
family planning officials to be insufficient for a finding of past persecution where "he suffered only minor
bruising ... which required no formal medical attention and had no lasting physical effect"); Cabas v.
Holder, 695 F.3d 169, 174 (1 st Cir. 2012) (receipt of several threats and one incident where petitioner was
"kidnapped, beaten, and left unconscious in a remote location" did not compel conclusion that petitioner
suffered persecution); Hussain v. Holder, 576 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that to constitute perse-
cution, a person's experience must rise above "unpleasantness, harassment, and even basic suffering")
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Touch v. Holder, 568 F.3d 32,39 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting
that, "although the government unquestionably mistreated [applicant] during the protests beating him
and forcing him to drink wastewater [applicant] did not suffer serious or permanent injuries"); Ritonga
v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971,976 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Ritonga suffered minor injuries only once .... [W]e can-
not say this constituted persecution.")); Bracic v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010) ("[O]ne
episode of physical mistreatment does not necessarily require the Court to find that the respondent suf-
fered past persecution.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nzeve v. Holder, 582 F.3d
678, 684 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that single assault where petitioner was beaten with batons, kicked, hit
with a gun, and which resulted in blisters and bruising did not compel a finding of past persecution);
Mekhtiev v. Holder, 559 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2009) (denying petition for review where petitioner was
"detained overnight and beaten one time," but "[h]is resultant injuries d[id] not appear to have been
severe," "requir[ing] only stitches and bed rest"); Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 313 14 (7th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that brief detention, hair-pulling, verbal taunting and interrogation, and search of home did
not constitute persecution).
218. See Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We have defined persecution as an
'extreme concept' that includes the 'infliction of suffering or harm."') (internal citations omitted); Butt v.
Keisler, 506 F.3d 86, 90 (1 st Cir. 2007). To be clear, I am not advocating for a higher-than-normal thresh-
old for harm to constitute persecution in the persecutor bar context than in the relief context. Rather, the
same term should be construed the same in both contexts.
219. See Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (B.I.A. 1988), overruled on other
grounds by Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522-23.
220. See Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. 347,366 (B.I.A. 2018).
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persecution. However, if there is evidence that sufficiently severe harm
occurred, the analysis must then proceed to consider whether there is a nexus
between the harm inflicted and a protected characteristic.
B. On Account Of A Protected Characteristic Of The Victim
Consistent with the statutory language of the persecutor bar itself, the act
of harm identified above must have been inflicted because of a victim's pro-
tected characteristic.221 The Board has long recognized the importance of
considering nexus in the persecutor bar context:
[I]f one were to find that a policeman or guerrilla was a victim of 'per-
secution' within the scope of the Act based solely on the fact of an
attack by one against the other, then it would follow that the attacker
had participated in an act of 'persecution' that would forever bar him
or her from relief . Such a 'broad' interpretation of the concept of
persecution on account of [a protected characteristic] would have the
actual effect of greatly narrowing the group of persons eligible for asy-
lum and withholding. Virtually all participants on either side of an
armed struggle could be characterized as 'persecutors' and would
thereby be ineligible for asylum or withholding of deportation. The
concept of 'persecution' has not been so broadly defined.222
The Board further elaborated that harm or injury inflicted as a natural con-
sequence of civil strife is not persecution, as there is no nexus to a protected
221. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 349, 369; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (requiring the
Attorney General to decide the applicant assisted or participated in "the persecution of an individual
because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion"); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (explaining that an applicant is not eligible for asylum if she or she
"assisted or... participated in the persecution ... on account of' one of the protected characteristics) (em-
phasis added); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (same); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(2)(i)(E) (same); Negusie, 555
U.S. at 515 (noting that "[ilt was undisputed that the prisoners [respondent] guarded were being perse-
cuted on account of a protected ground"); Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2016)
(explaining in the persecutor bar context that "[tihe persecution must.., be based on a protected ground,
which would qualify the persecuted individual for refugee status in the United States."); Miranda
Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 925, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (same); Meng v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1071,
1074 (2d Cir. 2014) ("a nexus must be shown between the persecution and the victim's race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion") (internal citations and quota-
tion marks omitted); Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 578 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2009) (reversing denial of asylum
where, inter alia, there was no proof of a nexus); Balachova v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 374, 384-87 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that the bar did not apply regardless of the level of assistance because there "was no show-
ing of a 'nexus"' to a protected ground); Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 663 (B.I.A. 1988) (noting
that there must be a nexus to determine one has engaged in persecution); Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19
I. & N. Dec. 811, 815-16 (B.I.A. 1988) (explaining that harm is not persecution unless it is "directed at
someone on account of one of the five categories enumerated in section [ 1101(a)(42)(A)]"), overruled on
other grounds by Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522-23); Matter of J.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec. 27, 29-30 (B.I.
A. 2017) (positively citing Rodriguez-Majano for the proposition that when "analyzing a claim of perse-
cution.. ., one must examine the motivation" of "those who committed the underlying persecutory acts"
to determine if such acts were committed on account of a protected characteristic).
222. Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 663 (B.I.A. 1988) (emphasis added).
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characteristic.223 Similarly, in Matter of Rodriguez-Majano the Board states
that "[i]n analyzing a claim of persecution in the context of civil war, one
must examine the motivation of the group threatening harm.,
2 24
This is not to say, necessarily, that there is a requirement for the applicant-
alleged to have assisted in persecution-to share a persecutory motive with
those engaged in direct persecution to apply the bar. The Board recently con-
sidered this specific question and concluded that an applicant's "personal
motivation [on the question of nexus] is not relevant" to the persecutor bar
analysis.22 Whether courts will defer to that interpretation remains to be
seen.2 26 Regardless of the answer to that specific question, if the record fails to
establish a nexus between the sufficiently severe harm identified in step one
above and a protected characteristic, then an applicant may not be found to
have assisted or participated in persecution because there is no underlying act
of persecution.227 Here too, the Board in Matter of Negusie briefly reaffirmed
this point by stating that "we interpret the term 'persecution' in the persecutor
bar as carrying the same meaning as it does in the context of determining an
alien's eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal,' 228 thus incorporating
the ordinary nexus analysis utilized when applying for relief.229
C. A Connection Between The Applicant's Conduct And The Identified Act
Of Persecution
Once it has been determined that an identifiable act of persecution has
occurred, the analysis may then proceed to consider whether there is a suffi-
cient connection between the applicant's "role, acts, or inaction" and the
identified act of persecution.230 As such, an individual's responsibility or
223. Id.; Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811, 815-16 (B.I.A. 1988) (finding that "activ-
ities directly related to a civil war" are not persecution because "harm which may result incidentally from
behavior directed at another goal... [i.e.] the defense of [a] government against an opponent" is not done
with the "intent [to]... overcome a [protected] belief or characteristic .... ), overruled on other grounds
by Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522-23.
224. See Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 815-16 (where the evidence showed that
"respondent engaged only in military activities of the type normal in such conflicts ... ," such activity
"cannot be said to constitute persecution")
225. Matter of Alvarado, 27 1. & N. Dec. 27, 29 (B.I.A. 2017).
226. Cf. Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 814-815 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing the BIA where it
failed to consider respondent's "uncontroverted testimony that ... he shared no persecutory motive" with
the persecutor he was allegedly assisting).
227. Gao v. U.S. Atty' Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Before we can determine whether
[the applicant's] conduct contributed directly to persecution. . ., the record must first reveal an identifiable
act of persecution in which [the applicant] allegedly assisted.").
228. See Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. 347,366 (B.I.A. 2018).
229. See id. at 349 (noting that the prisoners who Mr. Negusie guarded were "tortured ... on account
of a protected ground.").
230. See Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 367; Gao, 500 F.3d 93 at 100; Hernandez, 258 F.3d at
813 (a "court ... should engage in a particularized evaluation in order to determine whether an individu-
al's behavior was culpable to such a degree that he could be fairly deemed to have assisted or participated
in persecution.") (emphasis added); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1101(a)(42)(A);
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(2)(i)(E).
[Vol. 33:213
2019]PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN THE PERSECUTOR BAR ANALYSIS 245
culpability must be assessed along a continuum of conduct from actions inte-
gral to the persecution of others to actions that are only tangential.2 31
There is substantial support for the principle that the applicant's "assis-
tance" or "participation" must be purposeful and material to the persecutory
act, and not tangential, indirect, or otherwise inconsequential.2 32 To consti-
tute genuine assistance, the adjudicator must consider whether the applicant
had "direct personal involvement" or played a "material," "integral" role that
"furthered" the persecutory act; tangential, indirect, or inconsequential asso-
ciation will not be sufficient to trigger the bar.233
The facts and holdings in Singh v. Gonzales, Gao v. INS, and Higuit v.
Gonzales, are instructive.234 In Singh, the Court found that mere membership
in the Punjabi police during the period of persecution would not fall within
the statutory prohibitions, but Singh's role in taking Sikhs into custody and
transporting them to the police station, where he knew they would be sub-
jected to physical abuse, constituted assistance in persecution.235 In making
this determination, the Court emphasized the frequency of the conduct and
Singh's awareness of the persecution. 6 In Gao, the Court likewise con-
cluded that by transporting captive women to locations where they were
231. See Miranda-Alvarado v. Gonzalez, 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006); Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d
510 (2d Cir. 2009); Gao v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Where the conduct was active and had
direct consequences for the victims, we concluded that it was 'assistance' in persecution. Where the con-
duct was tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in nature, however, we declined to hold that it
amounted to such assistance."); Chen v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 513 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The
standard ... is a particularized, fact-specific inquiry into whether the applicant's personal conduct was
merely indirect, peripheral and inconsequential association or was active, direct, and integral to the under-
lying persecution.") A footnote in Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34, is cited frequently
in this analysis of a continuum of culpable conduct. The Court put the matter this way:
[A]n individual who did no more than cut the hair of female inmates before they were executed
cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution of civilians. On the other hand, there can be no
question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who was paid a
stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp to visit a nearby village, and
who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant of the camp, fits
within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution of civilians.
232. See e.g., Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the applicant's
action must constitute "personal involvement and purposeful assistance" and that to determine "personal
involvement," Js should assess whether (1) the "involvement was active or passive" and (2) the appli-
cant's acts were "material to the persecutory end."); Chen, 513 F.3d at 1259 (holding that the key inquiry
is "whether the applicant's personal conduct was merely indirect, peripheral and inconsequential associa-
tion or was active, direct and integral to the underlying persecution"); Gao, 500 F.3d at 99 ("Where the
conduct was active and had direct consequences for the victims, we concluded that it was 'assistance in
persecution.' Where the conduct was tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in nature, however,
we declined to hold that it amounted to such assistance.") (internal quotations omitted); Miranda
Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that the applicant's acts must be in
"furtherance of" the persecution, not merely "peripheral"); Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec
811, 815 (B.I.A. 1988) (concluding that an applicant is subject to the persecutor bar only if his or her
"action or inaction furthers [the] persecution in some way.").
233. Matter of D-R-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 105, 120 (B.I.A. 2017) (requiring consideration of whether the
applicant had "direct personal involvement" and whether the applicant's "role was material or integral"
to the harm, but eschewing the passive/active distinction).
234. Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2006);
Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2006).
235. See Singh, 417 U.S. at 740.
236. Id.
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forced to undergo abortions, respondent played an active and direct role in
the persecution.23 7 The Court pointed out that the respondent was a necessary
link in the chain leading to persecution.238 Similarly, in Higuit, the Court
found that an applicant who had served as an intelligence officer in the re-
pressive Ferdinand Marcos regime for more than 10 years was barred from
asylum because that "[respondent] was aware that his information-gathering
and infiltration led to the torture, imprisonment, and death of [political
opponents].239
In contrast, it has long been held that group membership alone cannot con-
stitute genuine assistance or participation in a persecutory act.240 Indeed, the
BIA has held since 1988 that "mere membership in an organization, even one
which engages in persecution, is not sufficient to bar one from relief' as a
persecutor.241 Nearly every circuit to have considered the issue has agreed
that membership alone is not sufficient to apply the bar.24 2 This conclusion is
also in keeping with the consensus developed under international law inter-
pretations.243 The war crimes tribunals, for example, distinguished between
individual criminal liability and mere membership in an organization that
engaged in war crimes.2 44 And, the UNHCR Guidelines explicitly state that
237. SeeXie, 434F.3dat 142.
238. See id. at 143.
239. See Higuit, 433 F.3d at 417 (emphasis added).
240. See Matter ofRodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. 811, 814 (B.I.A. 1988); see also Gao v. U.S.
Atty'l Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that "the mere fact that [Respondent] may be associ-
ated with an enterprise that engages in persecution is insufficient by itself to trigger the effects of the per-
secutor bar.").
241. Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 814-15.
242. See Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 558 F.3d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that "a distinction must
be made between genuine assistance in persecution and inconsequential association with the persecu-
tors"); Gao, 500 F.3d at 99 ("the mere fact that Gao may be associated with an enterprise that engages in
persecution is insufficient by itself to trigger the effects of the persecutor bar"); Miranda Alvarado v.
Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 929 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that "mere acquiescence," membership in an organi-
zation, or simply being a bystander to persecutory conduct are insufficient to trigger the persecutor bar);
Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that "simply being a member of a local
[] police department during the pertinent period of persecution is not enough to trigger the statutory pro-
hibitions on asylum"); Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he mere fact that [the alien] may
be associated with an enterprise that engages in persecution is insufficient by itself to trigger the effects of
the persecutor bar") (emphasis added); see Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that evidence of an identifiable act of persecution not just "any involvement with a persecu-
tory group" must be coupled with "evidence that an applicant ... has assisted or participated in [that]
persecution" for the bar to apply) (emphasis added); Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir.
2016) ("Generalized evidence that he applicant was involved with a persecuting group is not enough.");
Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 927, 929 (citing Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 632 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir.
2004), for the rule that that "mere ... membership in an organization" is insufficient to trigger the perse-
cutor bar).
243. See Evans, supra note 7, at 470, 526-527 ("Membership alone is not enough to come within the
scope of these declarations") (citing 15 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS 151 (1949); see also UNHCR, ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION NEEDS OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS FROM ERITREA 36 (2011) [hereinafter UNHCR ELIGIBILITY
GUIDELINES] (stating that "membership in the Government security forces or armed opposition groups is
not a sufficient basis in itself to exclude an individual from refugee status" and emphasizing the necessity
to consider whether the applicant was "personally involved in acts of violence ... or knowingly contrib-
uted in a substantial manner to such acts").
244. 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 273-77 (1966); 15
U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 170-75 (1949).
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membership "does not in itself entail individual liability for excludable
acts."245
While the Board in Matter of Negusie did not provide much analysis on
the level of connection required to constitute assistance or participation, it
did affirm that "the adjudicator should consider ... the 'nexus between the
alien's role, acts, or inaction' and the persecution" identified in the initial
steps.246 With regards to the significance of membership in a group with a
poor human rights record, the Board was conspicuously silent.247 Although
the Board in Matter of Negusie made no pronouncements on the signifi-
cance of membership in a persecutory group, to the extent that the reason-
ing of Matter of M-B-C- alters that analysis, the Board in Matter of
Negusie made no effort to distance itself from the lax-procedure
approach 24 adopted in M-B-C-.
249
D. Prior or Contemporaneous Knowledge
Finally, to constitute culpable assistance or participation, the adjudicator
must also find that the applicant possessed the requisite level of scienter, that
is, prior or contemporaneous knowledge of the persecution such that the
applicant knew that the consequences of her actions would assist in persecu-
tion.250 The Board in Matter of Negusie likewise affirmed the importance of
scienter in the analysis of whether one's assistance may be determined to be
culpable.251 This element is also consistent with international law. Indeed,
the war crimes tribunals observed that the definition of war crime "should
exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purpose or acts of the
organization.'25 2 Given the close recognized relationship between the
245. UNHCR ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES, supra note 245, at 19; R (on the application of JS) (Sri
Lanka) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2010] UKSC 15, [2] (appeal take from [2009] EWCA Civ
364) (Lord Brown, SCJ) (Eng.) ("It is common ground between the parties ... that [inter alia] because of
the serious consequences of exclusion for the person concerned.., more than mere membership of an or-
ganization is necessary to bring an individual within the article's disqualifying provisions.").
246. Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. 347, 367 (B.I.A. 2018).
247. See generally id.
248. See supra Section I.B.
249. Rather, as stated above, the Board in Matter of Negusie cited approvingly of Matter of M-B-C-.
See Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 366.
250. Matter of D-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 105, 120 (B.I.A. 2017) (the applicant must have "sufficient
knowledge that the consequences of his actions may assist in acts" of persecution "to make those actions
culpable"); Meng v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1071, 1074 (2d Cir. 2014) (requiring "sufficient knowledge" that
one's actions may assist in the persecution in order to be found culpable); Quitanilla v. Holder, 758 F.3d
570, 577 (4" Cir. 2014) (the applicant must "have acted with scienter," or with "some level of prior or
contemporaneous knowledge that the persecution was being conducted."); Haddam v. Holder, 547 F.
App'x 306, 312 (4" Cir. 2013) (requiring examination of the "intent, knowledge, and the timing" of the
applicant's alleged assistance); Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 20 (1 Cir. 2007) (noting
that "the term 'persecution' strongly implies both scienter and illicit motivation"); Matter of J.M.
Alvarado, 27 1. & N. Dec. 27, 28 (B.I.A. 2017) (adopting the First Circuit's requirement that the applicant
have "prior or contemporaneous knowledge" of the "persecutor acts" to apply the persecutor bar).
251. See Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 367.
252. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 246, at 273-77; U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM'N, supra note 245, at
151; United States v. Carl Krauch, "The Farben Case," VIII Trials of War Criminals Before the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10 (1952) (absolving individual plant
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persecutor bar and the war crimes provision of the Refugee Convention, the
requirement of culpable prior or contemporaneous knowledge is in keeping
with Congressional intent.253
As shown above, each substantive element of the above four-part test for
determining whether one has assisted or participated in persecution was
largely present in the Board's persecutor bar analysis in Matter of Negusie.
There, the Board held that the record established that Mr. Negusie-who had
been forcibly conscripted into the Eritrean military-had "guarded prisoners
to make sure they did not escape" and even kept watch over some "who were
placed in the hot sun as a form of punishment" resulting in at least one
death.25 4 The Board also noted that the "prisoners ... were tortured ... on
account of a protected ground," and that Mr. Negusie's actions were both
connected to that persecution and conducted even while he knew that the per-
secution was occurring.2 ' As such, the Board found that the record estab-
lished: (1) an identifiable act of persecution occurred involving sufficiently
severe harm; (2) that it was inflicted on account of a protected characteristic;
(3) that the applicant's conduct was connected to that act by standing guard
throughout the persecution, and; (4) that he had contemporaneous culpable
knowledge that persecution was occurring.2 6 The forgoing elements of assis-
tance or participation in persecution should be deemed settled principles.
IV. THE NECESSARY PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED TO APPLY THE
PERSECUTOR BAR
Contrary to the rule adopted in Matter of Negusie, I argue here that it is
only when DHS has introduced evidence sufficient to allow the adjudicator to
make the above four-part, preliminary findings by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the bar can be applied.25 7 The Board by contrast set DHS's burden
at a prima facie standard and held that once DHS meets its burden to show
that the bar may apply, the generic-relief regulation functions to switch the
burden of proof to the putative refugee to prove dispositively that the bar
does not apply.258 Above, I have already discussed why use of the generic-
relief regulation is misguided. In the section below, I argue that the
managers from liability for crimes against humanity where they have functioned simply as members in
the plant); Ezokola, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 678 at 796 (Can.) (concluding that "[alt a minimum," exclusion from
refugee protection "requires an individual to knowingly (or at the very least, recklessly) contribute in a
significant way to the crime of criminal purpose of the group").
253. See supra Section I.A.
254. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 348-49.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See e.g., Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9" Cir. 2016) ("[R]equir[ing] a threshold
showing of particularized evidence of the bar's applicability," which involves putting forth "evidence of
each element before the burden of proof shifts..."). See infra Section IV.2. for further discussion of bur-
dens of proof.
258. Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 348-49.
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preponderance of the evidence standard is the most harmonious with the stat-
ute and analogous frameworks employed by the Board to address similar asy-
lum and withholding bars. Additionally, I maintain that before the bar is
actually applied, the applicant must be put on notice that the adjudicator has
made these specific findings, and she must be given an opportunity to pro-
duce countervailing evidence related to one of those four findings, or other-
wise establish a duress defense.9
In the normal course of most proceedings where the persecutor bar
emerges, the prophylactic measures discussed here would require DHS to
inform the applicant well in advance of any merits hearing that DHS intends
to raise the persecutor bar with respect to specified acts. This would afford
the applicant the opportunity to present evidence at the merits hearing to
rebut the persecution allegation (and/or establish a defense such as duress).260
If DHS were not to provide such advance notice-and the persecutor bar is
raised for the first time at the applicant's merits hearing-the applicant should
be allowed to seek a continuance to develop appropriate evidence in
response.26 1
A. A Framework No Less Protective Than The Procedures The Board Has
Adopted For Similar Bars With Less Serious Consequences
The process for applying the persecutor bar should proceed as follows:
First, the adjudicator should determine whether the applicant is eligible for
asylum or withholding of removal.262 Second, if the applicant is otherwise el-
igible for protection, the adjudicator should determine whether DHS has sub-
mitted sufficient evidence to sustain the above four-part findings by a
preponderance of the evidence such that the persecutor bar applies.263 Third,
259. See e.g., Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 155-60 ("Given the serious consequences of a frivo-
lous finding," minimum "procedural safeguards" require (1) "specific finding[s]" by the IJ that "tak[e]
into account" the applicant's response in relation to the substantive elements of a frivolous finding, (2)
established by "a preponderance of the evidence" in the record, (3) made only after notice has been given,
and (4) the applicant has had a sufficient and ample opportunity to respond.); Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. &
N. Dec. 486, 501-03 (B.I.A. 2011) (setting forth a four-part "framework for making firm resettlement"
determinations where "DHS bears the initial burden of establishing that [the] evidence indicates that a
mandatory bar to relief applies," after which, the applicant must be given an opportunity to "rebut the
DHS's... evidence," or otherwise establish an exception applies).
260. See e.g., Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 159-160.
261. Id. This proposal is also consonant with the principles of international law. See AS (c.55 "exclu-
sion" certificate -process) Sri Lanka v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2013] UKUT 00571 (IAC),
[28] (Eng.) ("It is the nature of litigation, certainly in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber, for new evi-
dence or issues to arise during a hearing. If a party considers that they have not been given sufficient op-
portunity to deal with the new point, an application for an adjournment can be made. If the respondent's
case on exclusion changes during a hearing this can be addressed in the same way, by an adjournment,
short or longer, depending on the particular circumstances.").
262. See Matter ofNegusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 366; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1) (2); 123 1(b)(3)(A) (B)
(The statutory text and overall structure support a sequenced analysis that first defines eligibility before
proceeding to the exceptions to eligibility).
263. See Matter of Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155-60 (discussing burdens and quantum of proof);
Matter of J.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec. 27, 28 (B.I.A. 2017) (discussing the four elements of assistance
in persecution); infra Section IV.A.2.
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the applicant should be given fair notice and ample opportunity to demon-
strate that the government has not in fact met its burden in relation to one or
more the above four-part findings of assistance or participation in persecu-
tion.264 If the applicant cannot rebut at least one of the preliminary findings,
then the burden shifts to the applicant to establish a duress defense by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.265
These minimum procedural safeguards for applying the persecutor bar are
extrapolated from the frameworks the BIA has required in the firm resettle-
ment bar and frivolous asylum bar contexts, analogous bars that serve as
benchmarks for the safeguards proposed here.266 Given the relative gravity of
these three bars-the persecutor bar being by far the most serious-it would
be unreasonable to adopt in the persecutor bar context a set of procedures less
protective than those the BIA has adopted in the firm resettlement and frivo-
lous asylum bar contexts.267
It does not make sense to think that Congress would intend to bar manda-
tory protection even to refugees who face a certainty of persecution on the ba-
sis of less evidence and with fewer procedural safeguards than it requires in
order to bar discretionary asylum relief to refugees who face only a reasona-
ble possibility of persecution. While the firm resettlement bar renders an
applicant ineligible for asylum, it is not a bar to withholding.268 Similarly, the
frivolous asylum bar-though carrying even more serious and far-reaching
consequences than the firm resettlement bar by rendering an applicant perma-
nently ineligible for asylum and other relief under the Act-does not bar eli-
gibility for withholding.269 Of the three bars, it is only the persecutor bar that
results in permanent ineligibility for both asylum and withholding.270
In A-G-G-, the Board identified a four-part framework for applying the
firm resettlement bar that is informative to the task here of delineating the
appropriate procedural safeguards with respect to the application of the per-
secutor bar.271 First, the Board held that "DHS bears the initial burden" to
264. See infra Section IV.A.2.
265. See Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 155-60; Matter of Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 28, n.2 (cit-
ing Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 17, 21 n.3 (is Cir. 2007) and 8 C.F.R. 1240.8(d)). Finally, only after
it is determined that the applicant failed to establish a duress defense would the IJ actually apply the per-
secutor bar. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 503 (B.I.A. 2011); Matter of Y-L-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. at 155-60.
266. See Matter ofA-G-G-,25 I. & N. Dec. at 501-02; Matter ofY-L-,241. & N. Dec. at 155-60.
267. See Matter of Khan, 26 I. & N. Dec. 797, 804 (B.I.A. 2016) (noting the importance of adopting
a standard that would result in a "harmonious [and symmetrical] statutory scheme") (citing FDA. V.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (explaining that in determining the mean-
ing of a statute, a court must "interpret the statute 'as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme'...
and 'fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole"')).
268. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (containing a firm resettlement bar to asylum), with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B) (omitting any firm resettlement bar for withholding).
269. See Matter of Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 154-155 (finding that the frivolous asylum bar makes one
"permanently ineligible for any benefits under [the INA]," but it "shall not preclude [an applicant] from
seeking withholding of removal").
270. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
271. SeeMatterofA-G-G-,251.&N. Dec. at501-02.
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present prima facie evidence of an offer of firm resettlement.272 To meet
its burden, the Board explained that DHS must "secure and produce" direct
evidence-or, when unavailable, indirect evidence that "has a sufficient level
of clarity and force"-to "establish that [the applicant] is able to permanently
reside in the country. "273 The "inquiry ends if DHS fails" to meet its burden
"or the record does not otherwise establish the existence of an offer of firm
resettlement.'274 However, if DHS has presented sufficient evidence of firm
resettlement, then at the second step, the applicant must be given the opportu-
nity to rebut DHS's evidence by showing that "an offer has not, in fact, been
made" or that the applicant's circumstances would render her ineligible for
such an offer.275 Third, the IJ must weigh "the totality of the evidence" and
determine whether the applicant has "rebutted ... DHS's evidence. "276
Finally, if the adjudicator determines that the applicant was firmly resettled,
the burden shifts to the applicant to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence an exception applies.277 It is only after each of these steps has been ana-
lyzed that the adjudicator may actually apply the bar.278
Similarly, in the frivolous asylum bar context, the Board in Y-L- recog-
nized four "procedural safeguards" necessary "[g]iven the serious conse-
quences of a frivolous finding. '27 9 Among those procedural safeguards are:
(1) notice to the applicant that filing a frivolous application will result in "per-
manent ineligibility for any benefits under the [INA] except for withholding
of removal;" (2) "specific findings" related to the substantive elements of friv-
olousness (i.e., deliberate fabrication of material elements of an asylum
claim); (3) "sufficient [and ample] opportunity" to respond to the allegations
of "any deliberate, material fabrications upon which the IJ may base a finding
of frivolousness;" and (4) the requirement that "the ultimate burden of proof
[be] on the Government" and that the IJ "provide cogent and convincing rea-
sons for finding by a preponderance of the evidence" the above substantive
elements of frivolousness only "[a]fter taking into account the respondent's
explanations."2 80
272. See id. at 496, 501 (emphasis added).
273. See id. at 501-02. (emphasis added).
274. See id. at 503 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 503.
276. See id.
277. See id. Two exceptions are provided in the regulations to the firm resettlement bar. If the appli-
cant can establish that "his ... entry into that country was a necessary consequence of his ... flight from
persecution, that he ... remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel,
and that he ... did not establish significant ties to that country," then the bar will not apply. 8 C.F.R. §
208.15(a). Alternatively, if "the conditions of his ... residence ... were so substantially and consciously
restricted by the authority of the country of refuge that he ... was not in fact resettled," then the bar does
not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b).
278. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 503.
279. Matter ofY-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151,155 (B.I.A. 2007).
280. See id. at 155-60.
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Because the frameworks of A-G-G- and Y-L- were crafted in contexts
involving consequences less severe than that of the persecutor bar,281 those
decisions simply establish a floor for the minimum procedural safeguards
required in the persecutor bar context. Given that the persecutor bar-as a
mandatory ground of denial for even withholding-carries more profoundly
devastating consequences than those in A-G-G- and Y-L-, the minimum pro-
cedural safeguards in the persecutor bar context must at least meet, if not
exceed, those provided in A-G-G- and Y-L- in order to provide "a symmetri-
cal and coherent regulatory scheme.
282
Both A-G-G- and Y-L- place the initial burden of proof squarely on the
government.283 And, while A-G-G- states that the government's burden is to
produce prima facie evidence,284 the more serious frivolousness bar requires
"cogent and convincing reasons for finding by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.'28 Similarly, both decisions require some form of notice and opportu-
nity to respond.286 Lastly, the decisions require that the adjudicator consider
the applicant's response, and the availability of any exception, before deter-
mining whether the bars actually apply.287 The next section will utilize and
adapt the procedural safeguards in A-G-G- and Y-L- to formulate safeguards
for persecutor bar analyses.
B. Proposed Procedural Safeguards
In the persecutor bar context, (1) DHS must bear the initial burden of proof
related to the substantive components of assistance in persecution; (2) the
evidence must be sufficient to sustain the adjudicator's specific findings by a
preponderance of the evidence; and (3) the bar cannot be applied until after
there has been notice to the applicant, a fair opportunity to respond, and due
consideration of any duress defense to the bar. Each of these procedural safe-
guards are discussed separately below.
281. As stated above, unlike the firm resentment bar and the frivolous asylum bar, the persecutor bar
renders one ineligible for withholding of removal. See supra note 265-67 and accompanying text.
282. See Matter of Marcos Victor Ordaz-Gonzalez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 637, 643 (B.I.A. 2015) (citing
FDA. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (explaining that a it is imperative
to "interpret the statute 'as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,'... and 'fit, if possible, all
parts into a harmonious whole."')).
283. Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 496 ("DHS bears the initial burden"); Matter of Y-L-, 24 1.
& N. Dec. at 158 ("the ultimate burden of proof [is] on the Government").
284. Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 501.
285. Matter ofY-L-,241. &N. Dec. at 158.
286. Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 503; Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 155-56, 159-60.
287. See Matter ofA-G-G-, 25 1. & N. Dec. at 503 ("the [IJ] will consider the totality of the evidence
presented by the parties to determine whether an [applicant] has rebutted DHS's evidence" before "find-
ing the [applicant] firmly resettled," but will only apply the bar if the applicant fails to meet her burden on
any exception to the firm resettlement bar); Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 157 ("plausible explanations
offered by the respondent must be considered in the ultimate determination of whether the preponderance
of the evidence supports a frivolousness finding").
[Vol. 33:213
2019]PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN THE PERSECUTOR BAR ANALYSIS 253
1. DHS Must Bear The Initial Burden Of Proof
The statute and case law confirm that DHS bears the initial burden of intro-
ducing sufficient evidence-in relation to the above four specific substantive
findings-such that the adjudicator can apply the persecutor bar. Indeed,
more than three decades ago, the Board held that while the persecutor bar is
referenced within 101(a)(42)(A)'s refugee definition, an applicant does not
bear the initial burden of proving she did not engage in persecution to estab-
lish she is a refugee.288 The Board in Acosta reasoned that:
"While the language of section 101(a)(42)(A) excludes from the defini-
tion of a refugee any person who 'ordered, incited, assisted, or other-
wise participated in the persecution of any person,' we do not construe
this language as establishing a fifth statutory element an alien must ini-
tially prove before he qualifies as a refugee. This provision is one of
exclusion, not one of inclusion...,289
Although the plain language of the statute assigns an applicant for asylum
or withholding the burden of establishing eligibility for relief, Congress has
been equally clear that this burden does not extend to the persecutor bar.290
The REAL ID Act of 2005,291 reinforced Acosta's assignment of the appli-
cant's burden of proof, confirming that the applicant does not bear any statu-
tory burden to prove that the persecutor bar does not apply. Section 1231 (b)
(3)(C), as amended by REAL ID, provides that, in determining whether an
applicant has demonstrated eligibility for withholding of removal, "the trier
of fact shall determine whether the [applicant] has sustained [her] burden of
proof ... in the manner described in clause (ii) and (iii) of section [1158(b)
(1)(B)]," which describes in detail burdens of proof relevant to asylum.292 In
turn, section 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), also amended by REAL ID, states that "the
burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that the applicant is a refugee
within the meaning of 101(a)(42)(A).' '293 To meet that burden, section 1158
(b)(1)(B)(i) provides only that "the applicant must establish that race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion
was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant. 
'
294
Consistent with Acosta, this "burden of proof' section makes no reference at
all to any affirmative duty on the applicant to prove that the persecutor bar
does not apply.295
288. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 219 n.4 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
289. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 219 n.4 (emphasis added).
290. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(4), 1231(b)(3)(B), 1158(b)(1)(B).
291. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
292. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C).
293. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
294. Id.
295. Id.; Matter ofAcosta, 191. & N. Dec. 211,219n.4 (B.I.A. 1985).
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Several decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals and the BIA confirm that
Congress has placed the initial burden related to the persecutor bar for an asy-
lum or withholding applicant squarely upon the government.296 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that "[i]t is unreasonable to expect applicants for withhold-
ing of removal and other forms of relief to anticipate what bars might apply
to their cases, and then to affirmatively rebut all of those bars.2 97 Moreover,
this burden allocation is consistent with the policy reasons underlying who
should bear a burden of proof. The Supreme Court has explained that the bur-
den of persuasion determines "which party loses if the evidence is closely
balanced.' 29 Applying that observation here supports placing the burden of
persuasion on DHS because the persecutor bar authorizes the removal of a
putative refugee to a country where they face a clear probability of persecu-
tion. That potential death penalty should not be imposed lightly; procedure
should not be set to impose it when the "evidence is closely balanced. ,
299
Likewise, international law supports putting the burden of proof squarely
on the government in the persecutor bar context. Indeed, UNHCR's guide-
lines state that "[u]nder the 1951 Convention, responsibility for establishing
exclusion lies with States."300 The guidelines also note that while in the eligi-
bility context, "the burden of proof is shared between the applicant and the
State (reflecting the vulnerability of the individual in this context) ...., sev-
eral jurisdictions have explicitly recognized ... [that] the burden shifts to the
State to justify exclusion under Article IF.
30 1
Accordingly, because of the textual structure and purpose of the bar and
because of the Board's existing procedural frameworks in analogous con-
texts, DHS must bear the initial burden of proof in relation to the persecutor
bar.302 On this point of procedure, the Board in Negusie agreed, holding that
"the initial burden is on the DHS to show evidence that indicates that the
296. See Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2016); Gao v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d
93, 103 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that "the government must "satisf[y] its initial burden of demonstrating
that the persecutor bar applies"); Castafieda Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2007)
("[Olnce the government introduced evidence of the applicant's association with persecution, it then
became Castaneda's burden..."); Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 160 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding in the
context of the frivolous asylum bar that " he ultimate burden of proof[is] on the Government") (emphasis
added); see also Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 501 (B.I.A. 2011) (holding that "DHS bears the
initial burden of establishing that [the] evidence indicates that a mandatory bar to relief applies" in the
firm resettlement context).
297. See Budiono, 837 F.3d at 1049.
298. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005).
299. See id.
300. See Note on the Exclusion Clauses, 4, UNHCR Standing Comm., U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/
CRP.29 (May 30, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68cf68/note-exclusion-
clauses.html.
301. See Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article iF of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 105-106, UNHCR (Sept. 4, 2003), https://www.
refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html.
302. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 519 (2009) (noting that when interpreting a statute, the
court must "look not only to the particular language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its
object and policy"); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (REAL ID Act), Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
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alien assisted or otherwise participated in persecution.'"303 Whether the gov-
ernment will continue to be allowed to meet its burden by running afoul of
the rule of Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,3°4 (i.e., a proposition is not
established by disbelieving a person's denial of it), remains to be seen.305
However, given the BIA's past practice of finding, through an approach not
clearly repudiated by the Board in Negusie, that the bar may apply (triggering
a burden-switch to the applicant and a subsequent adverse credibility find-
ing),30 6 it is imperative that the government's burden be set at a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
2. Only A Preponderance Of The Evidence Can Justify Application Of
The Bar
To actually apply the persecutor bar to an applicant otherwise eligible for
withholding or asylum, the INA requires the Attorney General to "decide [or
determine] that ... [the applicant] assisted or otherwise participated in ...
persecution.'"307 A preponderance of the evidence is required to make this
determination; a mere possibility that an applicant assisted in persecution is
not sufficient to apply the bar consistent with the statute.30 8
In the withholding and asylum context, facts established for purposes of
eligibility are found using a preponderance of the evidence standard.30 9 Facts
material to the frivolousness bar to relief are likewise held to the preponder-
ance standard.310 As such, the same preponderance standard should be
required for application of the persecutor bar. That interpretation is confirmed
when the persecutor bar is read within the larger context of the other bars to
asylum and withholding. Indeed, the language of the persecutor bar-which
requires the adjudicator to "decide" or "determine" that the applicant assisted
or participated in persecution-stands in contrast with the "danger to U.S. se-
curity," which merely requires "reasonable grounds for regarding" one a
303. See Matter of Negusie, 27 1. & N. Dec. 347,366 (B.I.A. 2018).
304. 340 U.S. 573,576 (1951).
305. See id.
306. See UNHCR, BEYOND PROOF: CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT iN EU ASYLUM SYSTEMS 46, 214
(2013) (noting that "the credibility of asserted material facts should be assessed with reference to the en-
tirety of the applicant's statements, including any additional information given to explain any apparent
inconsistencies, vagueness or doubts regarding plausibility").
307. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (explaining
that an applicant is not eligible for asylum if the Attorney General "determines that ... the alien ...
assisted, or otherwise participated in ... persecution") (emphasis added).
308. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
309. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 214-216 (B.I.A. 1985) ("It is the general rule" that the
truth of allegations is established "by a preponderance of the evidence"); see e.g., Matter of C-A-L-, 211.
& N. Dec. 754, 759 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that "internal resettlement [ground for denial] should be
applied only if' the IJ or BIA can make that finding by "a preponderance of the evidence") (emphasis
added).
310. See e.g., Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 157-58 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that the IJ "must
provide cogent and convincing reasons for finding by a preponderance of the evidence" the substantive
elements of a frivolous finding).
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danger to security to apply that bar.311 The "reasonable grounds" standard is
one "substantially less stringent ... than 'preponderance of the evidence,"'
and is roughly equivalent o the "probable cause" standard.312 In contrast, the
persecutor bar requires the adjudicator to actually determine that the appli-
cant assisted or otherwise participated in persecution.1 3
Had Congress intended for the persecutor bar to apply when there were
merely "reasonable grounds" to believe the applicant assisted or participated
in persecution, or may have assisted or participated in persecution, it could
have used that language.3 4 That it did not use the "reasonable grounds" lan-
guage must be given effect.35 As such, it would be legal error and irreconcil-
able with the statute as a whole to hold that the persecutor bar could be
applied on a lower standard, such as the "reasonable grounds for regarding"
standard.16
Rather, a preponderance of the evidence standard in the persecutor bar set-
ting is required both by the plain language of the statute as well as the grave
consequences the bar carries.317 As stated above, because a finding that an
applicant has assisted in persecution constitutes a bar to even withholding of
removal, the Board cannot adopt a standard of proof here less than that
311. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i), and 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), with 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv), and
1158(b)(2)(A)(iii)-(iv) (emphasis added).
312. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE U.S. § 6:23 (2015 ed.) (citing Matter of A-H-,
23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 786 (A.G. 2005); Matter of U-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356 (B.I.A. 2002) (finding
that probable cause existed where an applicant was merely a member and supporter of a group designated
as a terrorist organization)); see also Matter of R-S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 629, 640 (B.I.A. 2003); cf. Matter
of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec at 814-15 (stating that "mere membership in an organization, even
one which engages in persecution, is not sufficient to" apply the persecutor bar). To the extent that the
Board looked to Matter of R-S-H- in Alvarado, as guidance in construing 1240.8(d) in the persecutor bar
context, such reliance was misplaced given the disparate statutory language of the "danger to security"
bar at issue in R-S-H-, and the persecutor bar at issue in Alvarado. See Matter of J.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 27,28 n.2 (B.I.A. 2017).
313. See McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 598 n2 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[a] finding that there
are 'serious reasons' to believe the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime is far less stringent than a
determination that the alien actually 'ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participate in ... persecu-
tion,"' and suggesting, but not deciding, that the persecutor bar could require a "clear and convincing"
standard) (emphasis added), overruled in part on other grounds by Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744,
751 (9th Cir. 2005).
314. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv) (using the "reasonable grounds for regarding" language
in the danger to security bar), with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (making no use of such language in the
persecutor bar).
315. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) ("Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally pre-
sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (quoting
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); Matter of C-W-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 346, 352 (B.I.A.
2007) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statu-
tory scheme .. because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is com-
patible with the rest of the law.") (citing United'Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
316. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432.
317. See Matter of Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 157-58 ("Because of the severe consequences that
flow from a frivolousness finding, the preponderance of the evidence must support an Immigration
Judge's finding."); Gao v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 500 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In evaluating a persecutor
bar claim, it must be remembered that this provision authorizes the deportation of individuals who have
established that they would likely be persecuted.").
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standard adopted in Y-L-, where the consequences there did not include a bar
to withholding.
International law standards also support a preponderance of the evidence
standard for the persecutor bar. The Refugee Convention requires "serious
reasons for considering that" the applicant has, inter alia, "committed ... a
war crime" to apply the bar.318 Other signatories to the Refugee Convention
understand the "serious reasons for considering" language in the
Exclusionary provisions to require a high standard of proof.3 1 9 The UK
Supreme Court, for example, stated that exclusionary clause "should be inter-
preted restrictively and applied with caution" and that "[t]here should be a
high threshold 'defined in terms of the gravity of the act in question, the man-
ner in which the act is organized, its international impact and long-term
objectives, and the implications for international peace and security. '320 In
selecting this language, international law scholars have understood the
Convention to incorporate the requirement of individual culpability for two
purposes: (1) to exclude those undeserving of refugee protection, and (2) to
prevent serious criminals from evading punishment for their crimes.
3 21
Neither of these purposes is well-served by applying the bar on the mere pos-
sibility that one might have been involved in persecution.
3. The Applicant Must Have Notice And Opportunity To Respond
After DHS meets its initial burden of proof in relation to the persecutor
bar, the applicant should be informed of that result and provided a sufficient
opportunity to rebut DHS's evidence, consistent with necessary due process
322protections. This requirement is consistent with the procedural safeguards
318. Convention, supra note 49, art. iF.
319. See AS (c.55 "exclusion" certificate -process) Sri Lanka v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't
[2013] UKUT 00571 (IAC) (Eng.), [43] (quoting Al-Sirri and noting that "although a domestic standard
of proof could not be imported into the Refugee Convention... '[t]he reality is that there are unlikely to
be sufficiently serious reasons for considering the applicant to be guilty unless the decision-maker can be
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he is."') (emphasis added); see also supra note 25.
320. AI-Sirri v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't; DD (Afghanistan) v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't [2012] UKSC 54, [16], [2013] 1 AC 745 (Eng.) (citing 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 283 (1966)).
321. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 525 (2d ed.
2014); James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on the Exclusion of International Criminals, 35
MICH. J. INT'L L. 3, 7 (2013); Joined Cases C-57/09 & C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B & D,
2010 E.C.R. 1-10979.
322. See e.g., Matter of Y-L-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 151, 159-60 (In applying similar safeguards, the BIA
has held that "[i]n some cases, the Government may raise the issue .... , [i]n other situations, the
Immigration Judge may raise the issue and afford the respondent an opportunity to respond," but the bar
may not be applied unless the applicant "has had sufficient opportunity to" respond). The Court has long
held that the "touchstone" of due process is the requirement that proceedings be fundamentally fair, which
includes the right to notice and to be heard. See Gangon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (explaining in the
context of deportation proceedings that "no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at
some time, to be heard"); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including" noncitizens); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210
(1982) ("[E]ven ... [those] whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as 'per-
sons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth.. .Amendment[].").
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established in Y-L-. As stated above, the Board in Y-L- held that a frivolous-
ness finding may only be made if the IJ or BIA is "satisfied that the applicant,
during the course of the proceedings, has had sufficient opportunity to
account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim. 3 23 The
Board explained that "[i]n order to afford a sufficient opportunity," an IJ
should "bring this concern to the attention of the applicant prior to the conclu-
sion of the proceedings.324 Additionally, the Board required that "plausible
explanations offered by the respondent ... be considered in the ultimate
determination whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a frivo-
lousness finding. "325
Given the disparate gravity of a frivolousness finding (that does not bar eli-
gibility to withholding), and the persecutor bar (which does), the Board in
Matter of Negusie erred in adopting procedural safeguards in the persecutor
bar context less protective than those provided by Y-L-. Rather, the proce-
dural safeguards in relation to the persecutor bar must be adequate to ensure
that bonafide refugees are not unjustly subject to the bar, a goal entirely con-
sistent with the Refugee Convention.326
Only after (1) DHS has introduced sufficient evidence to allow the adjudi-
cator to make the above four preliminary findings, (2) the applicant has been
given fair notice and opportunity to respond, and (3) the adjudicator has
determined that the applicant failed to rebut DHS's evidence, should it be
permissible to apply the persecutor bar. Before the bar is actually applied,
however, the applicant should be given the opportunity to show by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that she qualifies for the duress defense.327 This final
step is in keeping with the analogous firm resettlement analysis, which also
shifts the burden of proof to the applicant to establish an exception applies.328
If the applicant fails to meet her burden to demonstrate that her assistance or
participation in persecution was the result of duress, then and only then
should the IJ actually apply the bar.
323. Matter ofY-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 159 (emphasis added).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 157.
326. AI-Sirri v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't; DD (Afghanistan) v. Sec'y of State for the Home
Dep't [2012] UKSC 54, [16], [2013] 1 AC 745 (Eng.) (finding that Article 1F(c) should be "interpreted
restrictively and applied with caution").
327. See Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347,366 (B.I.A. 2018); Gao v. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 93,
103 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[O]nce the government has atisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that the perse-
cutor bar applies, the burden would then shift to the applicant."); Pastora v. Holder, 737 F.3d 902, 906-07
(4th Cir. 2013) (Because the "totality of the specific evidence ... was sufficient to indicate that the perse-
cutor bar applied," the burden shifted to the applicant.); Castafieda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 21
(1st Cir. 2007) ("[O]nce the government introduced evidence of the applicant's association with persecu-
tion, it then became Castafieda's burden."); Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 812, 814 (explaining that
once there is "evidence that an applicant ... has assisted or participated in persecution," the applicant
must bear the burden.) (emphasis added).
328. See Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 503 (B.I.A. 2011) (if the adjudicator determines
that the applicant was firmly resettled, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence an exception applies); supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The structured and sequenced framework proposed in this article would
ensure a fair evaluation of the evidence with appropriate burdens of proof
and sufficient procedural safeguards consistent with the statute and due pro-
cess, which would focus the bar's application on bona fide human rights
abusers. At he core of this approach is an outright rejection of the use of the
generic-relief, burden shifting regulation in the persecutor bar context.
The framework previously adopted by the Board prior to Matter of
Negusie allowed for application of the bar when an applicant merely might
have assisted in persecution. This lax-procedure approach-anchored in the
generic-relief regulation as most saliently displayed in Matter of M-B-C-'s
reasoning-belies a poor policy determination: that it is preferable to errone-
ously apply the bar than to run any risk of granting protection to possible par-
ticipants in persecution. Such an approach strongly favors false positives
even where mistaken application of the bar is tantamount to a death sentence
and does not align with the reasoning expressed in the establishment of stand-
ards for similar bars.
In contrast, the procedural safeguards for which I advocate here are rooted
in the normative judgment, consistent with the principles that undergird the
Refugee Convention, that the greater evil to be eschewed in such adjudica-
tions is erroneously sending innocent refugees back to their deaths. While
bona fide human rights abusers should not be given safe haven, this objective
must not be so vehemently pursued that it is accomplished at the expense of
innocent refugees' lives. Because Matter ofNegusie neither admitted M-B-C-
's error, nor dispositively ended the lax-procedures it adopted, more work is
needed to shore up protective procedural safeguards for refugees accused of
assisting or participating in persecution. The procedural safeguards and ra-
tionale enumerated in this article can serve as a launch point for scholars and
litigators alike to advance this crucial work.
